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OHAPmB I
INTRODUC~IONt

John Dewey has

THE PROBLEM AND THE PROOEPURE
~ec.lved

his share

trom oppa••nt. and frie.d. alike.

o~

oritici •• both

Most 01' the attack. ha..,e bee.

brought oa by De.oyt. uaoonventloaal attitude, hI. denial ot the
absolute, his reje.tioR ot the atable, and his atr•• , ot the temporal.
~ho

!he er1tieal tield 8eem, to be occupi.d a. well by tho.e

te.l ao k1a.hip with pragmati.m a. by tho.e who in theoPJ

oxeroi •• protound obei.ano.
shri...

the prasmatic .ad t •• tru...tal

b.to~e

Somewhere i. the Ilo-man'. 1••4 betwee. coaplete eODd.m-

natioB oa the part ot oppO...tl, partial :reJeotioa

Oil

tho part ot

prapattltl, and eltAoorated adulatioJl Oft the part ot .ome Iutru.e.talilt. li •• the .a•• judgment ot JOhn DeW.l_
It was pr.ei •• lr b••au •• ot the ".7 a.d vaPJiag inter-

pretatioa.--I••• t!... diametrically oppo••d--given to the theoriel
ot Joha Dew.l' 07 adla1rlag tollo.... ot hi. that 'bh. pr••••t 1f1"1 ter
~Ir.t

b..... later•• t.d in the man.

or.t.

to~

i. a. 1• ..,•• tlaatioR ot

thi. inter•• t ha. tak•• co.-

~weltl

phi 10 lophi cal pri.olple.

1. ge••ral, aad 1n partioular bltO hi. aotiOR ot truth.

Por 1t

ao... ob..,iou. that i t 1.t.l11,0.t ... later,.e' a philoaopher 1.
contradictory m...or., .1ther the phl1olopher i. uaulual1l la.pt,
1

2

tr, aJ'ld thla W>1. the •••• h.re, h. ha. u uauaual ooaoept of truth
~1ch

of It .... tup. allow.; -7. Invites relatlve17 dittera.t la-

At the .ame tlme, ta1rae •• a.d iRlPartlal iav.stl-

,erpretatloR..
~atl0.

require that Dewe,.t. po.ltlon be explalned In It •• lt.

J1nc. the epl.temologloal core of aDY phl10sophioal .,.tem 1. 1.
ta cOReeptlon ot truth and th.attalnment thereof, thi. work
Jhall attempt to explal. what Job. Deway mean. b,. tl"Uth aad It,
.qui.ale.t term', and how he .e.ka to appl •• at It.

1ft our expla•• tloft ot Deweyt. doctrla. eoacarBine truth,
tmphaala will ba 1.ld upo.. peraoaal od aoelal taetora whioh .a-

ared lato lta

fo~latl...

OUr r ••aOR 18 that 1atlu••caa Dot

trletl,. phl10aophlcal ,1&,.4 a peat part In tOrmiq Dewe,.'. Idea
~

t twtb..

De"_,. 1"11'11ly be11e••d that

"philo80ph, or1&la.ted

lot out ot iatell.etual _ter1al, but out ot .oelal ..<1 em.otlo..1

l.terlal. ft1
J

POP

h1a the appeal ot philosoph, la,. 1& It. orlalR'

ro. aad 1 ta power over persoul and aoelal expe"..le.oe..

~on.tafttly

He

.tr••••• the Int1uene. ot persons, ot the t1me., ot

11. e.vlroament, aad ot hl. own reaetloR to all the.e lfttluence ••

ttpoa

~e ~ol.,n

h. tella us, "the toro•• that have influence. me

lave eome trom peraona ••dtre. a1 tuatloft8 mOI'G thaD trom. books. "2

1 Joh. Dewe7, Reco•• truotlon 1. Phl1080P!l, Wew York,
E.&17 Holt aad 00., 1920, 8.
2 JOAa Dewe" "From Ab.olutiam to EXperimentall ••,"
(oa'a1aDOparJ' Aaa1"1oan Phll0_OPt, Vol. II, ad. (Je0rs- P. Ad_ aad
HI1. Pappa"ll Ii.Gaue, I •• YOI' , 'lbe Ka0lll1114. 00., 1930, 22.

p

3
H•••• ' these 1.o1de.t. ot peraonal experteR.e Which latlu.nced
hI. i . the tormatteR of hi. 1deas must be

uade~.tood

it ve are to

uaderltand Dewey_

ot cours., philosophioal wrItings played
tormia, hi. id....

th.l~

part 1a

Ooat., aeSel, Darwin, and Buxle7 had their

Iatluenoe oa Dewey, aDd eaoh ot

tn,. playod a det18it8rol. i .

DeV8Y'. formulatioR and adoption ot his OORoept of truth.

1a the

psychological sphere the 1ntlu•••• ot Sp ••oer aad J . . . . was telt.

But

by amd large the coatrlbution ot the •••e. vas teenaical.

Where., phllo.ophers provided h1a with tne tremework, experie••e.
la OORorete .ituation. proY1de4 hi. wlth the matter ot hi. ph1loIOph"

1a add1t1on to being the caus. of htl

.t1aulul to hi. lave.t1sat1oR.

iater•• t aad the

Dew.y's phtlo.ophy

~a.

oreated bJ

vorkias baok a.d forth b.tween o.e field ot expert.... ..d
a.other.")
0Up

iate.tioa, theretore, 11 aot to .alataln that

Tarloua 1001al t.ctor. are the sol. aad exclusive cau.e. of the
de.elop. .nt of both Dew.y"

phIlosophy a. sucb and ot hi. theory

ot truth.' Certain logical and metaphysical preconoept10.S are

pr••••t in hi. wrIting, .a are alao the influenoes of various
Thua Dewey's acceptaace ot evolutionarl

philosophical theorle..

!he

3 Joseph Rat.er, "Dew.y's Ooaoept1oa ot Phl1o.ophl,"
ot Joha
ed. Paul A. Sohllpp. Ev..sto.,

Phl10.0ph~

Dei;;'9,

lortS•• stera ArVePitiy,

7).

4
aaturall •• with It. a ••oolate theor, or bl01os!.al and behavlorl.tio P.,choloIY 1.evitab1, 1.d hi. to certain praa-atlc 008clu.ion&
suoh ooueotl0•• Will be ahon 1. their proper

pla....

But behi.d

Deweytl aoo.ptano. or certaln priaclpl •• aad theorle. 11 •• a tread

ot aind, a o.rtal. P.,chological attitude wbloh Rot oall allow.
htm

it.

to b. hea.ily atteoted by .001al taotorl, but almo.t dema.de
Thi. attitude vae :aaa1te.ted bl hie ova .tat....t., aad,

above all, bl hi. lat.r•• t. whioh beSaa oa th• •001al l ••el aa4
••4ed

tm....

"ald.l, .001al ra.tora alwal1 r •••l ••4 prlorlt1 1.

Dewel'. tb.laldng, ..d It va. to eo1.e a:ad ohaqe eoolal eoaditl0••
that DenJ adopted prl.01ple. ot ••olution.a%7 aatur-all ..

od

blo-

10Sloa1 Pl1choloS7.4 !heretore, 1B a queetl0. ot empha.le, It

ct. w.

4 '!he ao.t r •••• t Dewe, orl t1c. oO••UP 1. thl. oplno••
f. F.ldaaa, Th.Ph110!02!+Z0t Joba
Baltl_.e, !h.

DeW;f'

J."..

Jobal Hopldu Pr•••-;-rq3li. Wirou'aIii'ul'"'11i. ea r. work the author
allud.. both d1r•• t17 &ad ladire.i17 to the .001010a1.a1 latlu. . . .
Xath....a, loba Dewel, , •• York, anarl.. Sorib.er'. ao•• , 19$1, S t the au \hor 10..
tar a. to sa,. that It
Dever hact bee. bora earller, h. would aot hay. becou the prot•• .10u1 phlloloph.r ot the tJ'pe
claim hl. to ha.e b.e.. BquallJ
.1Saltl ..., 1. the taot that ...thaDO. b.,i •• hie book wi th the
chapt.r tltl.4, "PhiloeoPll,. aad. au.aa ,robl... ," 1. wMGh h. givee
a hi.torr .1adlar to ~a' wbloh w. vll1 sl.e.
at. Gall Jt....q, "1.,"du.tl0.," ~a•• l • •a:rl ... Philo.o;ph.re, ed.. Mas B. J'1eob, I.w York, A,pla~....(S••tUr7...drorta;I ••• , 1951, 329 ttl the author OOPl-oborat•• the opl&1oa Slv•• 1a
thl. ohapt.r.
ct. Willi. . .
"Slsaltican•• ot Deve,." Phil0.oph~"
Ibe PhllO.O. ot Joba DeWI, e4. Paul A. 'ohllpp, Horthw.etera
UirveriIl7,
3rt ""1'Iii' wrIter .,lUae, a • •0 II&llJ Giber orltl0.
d.o 18 the ..... .olwu, the lat1u.... ot Dat-Wia up.. Dewer ... b.las
prt.arl1J .au••d b,. 8xt.:r..l t ...top. ot Chaace aad pr0sP... 1. a
erovlq world •
.u earl,. aa 1913 Prot••• or A. o. Lovejoy. "Beralo. a.ct

W.

av.p,..

.0

;,

..... better to .tr... the latlu••o. or 1001al raotor. a. do·
te~1l1.g

hl. oOB.ept ot truth rather tbaa to appeal to the latlu-

eDoe o.t .et pbilo,opol.al ,rlaolp1e. 1.01ate4 tro. tbelr .avlroa-

III explalBing tn. tactor. Influenoing Dewe,..t. oOlloept

ot phl10lcpb7 and hl. OOBoept of truth, •• well a. In .xpl.iRiIlS
the OORoopt ot truth 1 'a.lr, hi. owa wpi.las' ape til. mo.t 1JIportaat .cuo...

Hl • •,t poptl.o.t work 1.

I.qulPl .nloh i . tn.

~r7

~1101

1!!.!.

theopi

!!

ot ppe.loua Id... •• .e11 •• hi •

• 0. t detln1 t1.. phllo.ophl.e1 book.

aooeo,ruotlo.!! Phllol0Ehl,

e. oa:pllor work, ls al.o llaPOrtaat.

Ttlil bock g1 ye. De"e,."

ear17

aotlc•• aad 1 ....e17 u ••.tul 1ft 1.dleatag the b.glna.1aa aad S1'ovth

ftOmaR,10 BYolutloD1. .," Ua1voPlltl

438, had la41eet•• that th. pre •••t

!! Oalltoraia Qhroalele, XV,
•••lup1 mar.. e r.act!on

rroa

the e,ena1 . .4 1 ta 00••14eratl08 to a oo.oentpatioa ot oculdor~
the 1hlJl1I o.f tlmo. !he ID1lueado o.t the arti clo val maet. mopo exp1181 t D7 latOJII Dewe,.. er1 tloa. It 1 • •1p.1tlcu.' that Prof•• aor
Lo ...e J01 had e.,aced lit oOlltro...ep'l wi th Dewey APOud the tun or
the .e."'17 oa the subJe.t ot tnth.
So••thlq ct a lua.i V. arsuaent alsbt be dPan tN. the
worell ot Phi11p r. Wi ••er, Evolution ....4 the PouRd.r. 0.1' P N . ,
Oambridge, Harvard Ualver.! ~7 'reI., I1iij:'9;-lo, .... soola1 . . . r.
ot thousht 1. an .....t1&1 papt ot ,elree'. evolutlonllt phllo.Oph 1 aad •• ter. Into hi. cletlrdtloB ot truth. Ouik. Dew.,., hOlle...er, 'elroe .oaroel,. deala with "7 .p.oltio aooial prob1... "
It 1. cl1trleult to ••• where thls aooia1 nature ot thought wou.ld
arl.e It BOt 111 the eoa.pce'e olrcwutance. by which I)ewey val at
l.a.t ••ptivatect, it .ot tborougnly i.flu.aoed.
Ia ta. same book Wi •••r quote. 011vep We.dell Bola.,
att.r l"ead1ag Dewel" Pte!'1 ••' . and
tI'I thoupt It gpe.t
It ..... eI to •• to
Eo uil••i i i IIOre la...rdl1 &ad protoun417
than a"7 book I DOW, at l ••• t uy book 1n philosophy." 186. Mr.
Bolae. ret.ra to a t •• 11as tor the ..oial raeto1' ot the u.a1ve1'•••

t..

".'ure.

P'
6
ot Dewey' 8 ooacept ot truth.

!'!i!. 9!e8t !2!:. Certaintz and Expe-

Nature, publi.hed atter The
Influence
-- . . . . .ot. Darwin -Oft
PhilosophZ, give what might be termed Dewel's almost-tinal concept

...rience

~

ot truth.

Here, title. are misleading, tor we find more important

- Certainty.> -

-

informatioa on the subject ot truth in The Influence ot Darwin on
PhiloaophZ than we find in ~ 9Hest ~

Even those sources which do contaln Dewel's doctrine on
truth present their own difficultles.
i8 not easy reading.

AD article In

In the first place, Dewey

~

Magazlne oommemoratlng

Dewey'. R1netieth birthday states, "His blunt and bulky atyle was
.ever easy-

'Incredibll 111 written,' said Justice Holmes ot one

ot hl. books."6

Moreover, Dewel's terminology pre.ents a problem.

He ls addicted to Aew and yague terma, the meanlng ot which

0..

only be tound by comparison, compl1atlon, and careful observation

ot context.

Since his approach ls something peoullarll hls own,

his terminology tollows thi. individuali.tic pattern.

However,

constant studl and comparison. ot practically allot DeweJ's works
have revealed certain basic conceptions In Dewey'S thought.

Fol-

lowing the gen.sl. and growth ot hl. philosophy has provided a
aatls.t'actory dlstinctlon between the accidental and .s.entlal, the

5 For an aocurate and comprehenslve list ot Dewel's
most Important works and their eontents, ct: Max H. Flach,
Olaaslc American Phl1osophers, Appendlx, 415-4776

-

"Perpetual Arrlver," Tlme, L1V, October 31, 1949,

35.

p
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temporary ana permanent 1dea8.

Muoh, it is true, i8 obscure; or

it not obsoure, capable ot varied and indefinite interpretations.
sut there is a uaity 1n h1s work.

Th1s uD1ty, e.peoially in the

subjeot with WbiCh we are dealing--what John Dewey means by truth
.nd its equ1valent terma--become. apparent in a oareful .tudy ot
800ial, peraonal, and intelleotual taotors intluencing Dewey's

~he

~onceptio.

at truth.

Among the moat important secondary sources ot Dewe,.'.
!philolophy we have found
~ohn

~

Philosophies !?!

!:.

!!.. Tennant !.!!!

Dewe,. by J. Oliver Buswell, JrJ the articles by Arthur E.

~ph,.,

Dominique ParOdi, William savery, and Wiltrid Sellarl 1n

2!

~

.l.2!!!!.

~

Philolophy

~

Freedom edt ted by Sidaey Hook; and

Dewel;

.on to be elpecially uleful.

Dewel:

Philosopher

~

2!

Science

_De_w_el_ b,. Jerome Nathan--

The most important and accurate ex-

planation ot Deweyts philosophy as a whole i8 given by H. S.
Irhayer in hil work,
~ork

py W.

!!!!

Logic

~

Pragmatism.

on Dewey, though it is short, il
'1'.

.!!:!.

'lbe best cri tical

PhilosophZ !?!

~

Dewey

Feldman.
And sinoe extra-philo.ophical influences played IUch a

~arge

part in the formation ot DeweY'a concept ot truth, a know-

~edge

ot hi. personal hi.tory 1. 1mportant.

~ ~

Here,

~

Philosophl

Dewey, a collection ot e •• aya on the ph110.opher, i. in-

,aluable becau.e his daughter Jane, in her esaay, "Biography ot
ITOM Dewey," Ir ov1des us with a sigmiticant and personal hiatory

p
....
8
of her father.

His own article in Contemporary American Philo-

sophZ i8 likewise helpful, as are also atatementa scattered

-throughout his works which throw great light upon the e.rfects of
personal and social faotors in the formulation of his philosophical concepts.

CHAPTER II
FACTORS INFLUENCING JOHN DEWEY'S NOTION OF TRUTH
1.

THE INFLUENCE OF CULTURAL HEREDITY

When Dewey waa three years old (1862), Lincoln called a
day of prayer to counteract "the country' a depression after the
terrible defeat of the Union foroes at Fredrick8burg."l

Lincoln,

thought he may aot have realized it at the time, gave a speech
which embodied the spirit ot the times and which

involv~d

a re-

jection ot dogma and a treeing ot the minds trom doctrines which
seemed to be useless, ill-adapted to the critical and changing
times.
So, calling the people to prayer, Lincoln told them:
"~e dogmas of the quiet pa8t are inadequate to the
stormy present. The ocoasion is piled high wi th difficulty. and we mu8t rise to the ocoasion. As our
case il new, so must we think anew and act anew. We
mult dileathrall ourlelves, and then we ahall lave
Our coufttry."2
Victory for the Union ultimately came.

But the Itate ot complete

treedom trom dootrine. and dogmas ot the past never became pertect

1 Horace M. Kallen, "John Dewey and the Spirit ot PragmatiSM," John Dewez: Philoso,her of Science and Freedom, ed. Sidne,.. liook,-..w York, The Dial re.I;-l950, 3. --2

-Ibid.,

4.
9

p
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Naturally there
were ph110aophers who tended to blame an adherence

to dogmas of the past tor any and all ev11s.

Most Amer1can

pragmatists agreed w1th Lineoln'a statement and applied it even
turther.

They thought that due to the unsettled state of the

union, bel1ets Which were handed down to Americans trom their aaoestor. were antiquated.
must be abandoned.

It the nation was to be formed, the paat

Thi. was a new nation where survival depended

on intrepidity ot apirit.
The oooaaiona were new, the difticultie. high and the
thoughts and aotion, had to be Dew. Ancient dogma,
e,tabliahed habit or mere brute atrength were alike
in,utticien.t. A man waa on hia own. Hi, tamil,. were
oa their own. To stay a11ve the,. had to atudy out new
wa,., of new doing.. The,. had to disoard ~atever
ill the past tethered and strangled; they had to alter
and .treagthea that trom the past which could liberate
and au.tala. !he,. had to .earch and ,eek tor alternative. to routine. Survival became everywhere a CODlequenee of readines. to change, ot being tree to take
thought and ot taking It, alone tor one.elf, and again
by Cholce, together with one's neighborl.3
The America ot thoae daya waa a nation ot growth, ohange,
~nd

invention--an Amerioa ot new methoda.

Va.t area. of wilder-

•• a. were conquered firlt b,. the railroad, then b,. the telegraph,
~nd

ultimately by the telephone.

_ubdued.

The foroea ot nature had to be

Aa In any audde. prooeaa ot growth, change val the

Dharacteriatie.

It i. ea.y to .ee how thls lame change would be

applied to Idea. allo.

3

~.,

8.

The very lurvival of the people vaa ba.ed

pi
11
on ehange. ~It could almost be said that staying alive depended on

changing ways and methods.
were vitally ohanged.4
Dewey was

born.

Modes

o~

knowing, doing, and living

It was into this atmosphere that John

His parents lived their lives in the shadow ot

an Amerioa which was modernizing.5
Naturally the members ot Dewey's family, most

o~

whom

personally experieaced many change. in the essentials as well a.
the amenitie. ot

li~e,

youngest Dewey.

This influenoe went as

parents.
senter

tostered the spirit ot new methods in the
~ar

back as the gra.d-

For Dewey's grandtather " • • • was a temperamental dis-

~rom

established oonventions, a

~ree

tbinker who gave money

toward the erection o~ every church in his village."6

!hat thi.

unduly independent attitude left a permanent re.iduum in Dewey's
mind is evident from the tact that Dewey used to quote frequently
a .aying of his grandfather:

"'Some day these things will be

found out, and not only fouad out but known. ,"7

Quite obviously

4 Ibid., 8-9.
5 ct. Jerome Nathanson, John Dowey, 5:

-

"All this waa
of critical importance in the lite or-newey. Had he been born
fifty years sooner, whatever else he might have beoome, it is not
likely he would have been the protesaional philosopher we know;
or, if he had, he would have faced quite a difterent job trom the
one tha t co~ronted him."

6 Jane Dewey, "Biography ot John Dewey," 20.
7

-Ibid.,

21.

jiiS
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Dewey's grandtather was

DO

more satistied with the state ot oer-

tainty in knowledge than newey was to be

in his early philosophio

daya.
newey's mother and his wite also wielded a stroag influence in the ramilr and

OD

him.

His mother was a

WODlllD

been reared in an extremely individualistio atmosphere.

who had

!he

training ahe transmitted to John con.ieted largely ot doing whatever she thought right. 8
ci.ive.

B•• ld••

His wite's intluence was eVeD more de-

influenoing Dewey in the tield ot behavior ahe

had a protound ettect on concentrating his attention on hie personal environment and surroundings.

"She was undoubtedly largely

re.pon.ible for the early widening ot Dewey's philosophic

int.re~

trom the commentative and classical to the tield ot contemporarr
l1te."9

Dewey later on admitted that his wite exercised a tre-

mendous ph11osophical influence over him.

"rhatever skill Dewey

aoquired in so-oalled 'intuitive' judgment ot situations and
persons he attributes to her."lO

From his wite likewise he ac-

quired his dislike or dogma and ot ideas considered aa true in the
past.
Summarizing the influence ot Dewey's grandparents, or

8

Ibid.

9

Ibid.

10

-Ibid.

1.3
his

mother,~and

of his wife, we may say that it partook ot the

rugged, independent attitude that northern New England, espeoially
vermont, would foster in a man who would make his way In this
simple country area.

Dewey inherited attitudes from a 11ne ot an-

cestors that began in 16.30.

These ancestors unquestionably were

indivldualists whose personal reflection governed their actlons.
All of the. more or less stl'Uggled wi th what might be called
pioneer country.

Their thoughts naturally were centered on the

tield ot 11vlng in the concrete
gress.

circ~tance.

They telt Independent ot the past.

ot change and pro-

CirouMstances had

placed the. in a community where there were no tradltions.

Con-

.equently, they might almoat be called a law unto tnemselve ••
That the surroundings, both personal and natural, would create an
independent, constructive attitude in a thinking individual was
Inevitable. ll

11 Jane Dewey believed strongly that her rather was
Vitally influenced by cultural heredity. Speaking of the whole
Dewey family she says, "But it we consider cultural rather than
biological heredity there is no doubt ot the importanoe ot the
ploDeer background in their lives." Ibid. 4. Other observers
agree with Deweyts daughter. "Born aiiQ'Ored In northern New
England, Dewey has retained an appreoiatlon of the values ot the
tamily and local community. The.e value. he hope. may be carried
over Into the larger grOupings of the natlon and the world."
William Kell.y wrlght, A Hl8tor ot Modern Phl1010Ph{, New York,
The Macmlllan Company, 1'941, 53 •-The trend ot tne Imes, the
envlronment, and hoae condltions strength.ned Dewey 1n a desire to
abandon the past and torge hls own philosophio tuture. All tho ••
who have studied Dewey thoroughly agree that the enVironment,
tlrst ot Vermont, the. ot Chlcago, and later of New York, played a
great part in shaplng hls thought and philosophic doctrlne.

b

2.

THE INFLUENOE OF TEAOHING AND STUDY IN UNIVERSITIES

When John Dewey entered the University of Vermont, the
established philosophy was based "upon the writings of the Scotch
sohool."12

Dewey apparently was little afreoted by the standard

teaching Whioh predominated for over half a century.
less, Dewey •• time was not spent In vain.

Neverthe-

For here Dewey read

comte and Huxley from whom he recelved his first definite philosophic influence.

The "three stages" of Coate did not especially

interest him, but what Oomte said about finding a aocial function
tor science definitely found faTorwlththe young Vermonter.
"Reading comte and his Engllsh expos 1 tors flrst awakened in Dewey
his characteristic Interest in the Interaction of aooial conditione
with the development of thought in 8cienoe and philoaophy."13
a practioal illustration ot this, Dewey, in his last year of

Aa
001-

1ege,had written a paper, "The Limits of Po1itioal Eoonomy,"
bearing the imprint of Coate who always held that politioal eoonomy was subordinate to 800iology, the theory olearly maintained
~n Dewey's paper.14
~at

Along similar lines Coate lert Dewey oertain

soienoe, and this inoluded philosophy tor Dewey, must have a

12

Jane Dewey, "Biograph7 ot John Dewey," 11.

13

Ibid., 12.
-Ibid.,
- 12-13.

14

p
15
1001al

func~ion.

Here, then, tor

~le

flrst time, Dewey found

Itated what was to be one of his foremost considerations.
must affect social life in a vltal way.

Truth

Now the only way In whioh

truth oould reorganize 8001al life was, in Deweyfs opinion, it
truth In aome way or another changed so that it m1ght keep paoe
wlth the growth of oivilization.

Oomtets writings "about the dis-

organization ot exlsting social lite and the necessity of finding
a social function for science remained a permanent influenoe in
hls thought. "15

And equally important tor Dewey was the fact that

comte expressed tor him "the interaotion of social oonditions with
the development of thought in scienoe aDd in ph110sophy.n16
If Comte satisfied Dewey beoause he gave a 800ial
funotion to philosophy, Huxley intensified this satisfaction by
explaining olearly just how truth should grow and develop by his
felici tous oomparisonat' truth to the human organism.
words, allot life was of a pattern.

In other

The human organiSM, sinoe it

was a part ot external reality, must have the same characteristics
as reality.

Theretore, the growth and change of. social conditions

were reduplioated 1n the human organism a8 such and particularly
in the thought processes.

It was, in large and rough outline,

what was later to be called the theory of biological adaptation.

15 Ibid., 12.
16

-Ibid.
-

p16
~eading

Huxrey had provided this thrilling inaignt which was to

complement the intluence ot comte.

Dewey's debt to Huxley did

go uncontesa.d.

~ot

subconSCiously, at least, I was led to delire a world
and a lite that would have the same properties as had
the human organism in tne plcture ot lt derived trom
the study ot Huxley's treatment. • • • At all events,
I got great Itimu1ation trom the Itudy. • • • I date
tro. this time the awakening ot a d1stlnctive philo.ophio lnterest. l 7
~iS

phllollOphic interest ot })ewey had begun with a changing

~ocia1

world.

~o.ophic

Bow he was at the stage where he thought that phi-

principle. sultable tor a particular perlod mu.t keep

pace Wi th tba t pe rlod or be abandoned.

Slnoe socla1 oondl tlonl

pad been so drastically altered, philosophy too, it it were to
~urvive,

must adapt itselt to lts new ollmate.
Atter thl1 period ot study at the University ot Vermont,

p.wey moved to P.nnsylvania where he b.came a Ichool teacher.
~et

a philoaopher by voeatiOA, he was spending much ot his time In

reading, retlectiag, and wrlting.
~as

Not

At thls .... time ph1losophy

coming into it. own in the United States a8 an independent

praneh ot 8tudy.

Greatly reaponsible tor this blOSSOming ot

philosophy as a aelt-reape.ting protes8ion was W. T. Harri8 who
~s
~ost

later to become Commis8ioner ot Eduoation, and who had spent

ot hi8 early yeara propagating Hegelianiam.

17

Harris had

Dewey, "From Absoluti .. to Experimentalls.," 1.3.

p
17
~

•• tablished headquarters at st. Louis where he was editing the
magazine, Speculative PhilosophZ.

And it was to W. T. Harrla that

Dewey .ent some ot hla phllosophic wrlting to aee whether or not
• career aa a protea.ional philosopher mignt be

open ror hlm.

Harris expressed the op1nion that Dewey "showed a philosoph1oal
mind

ot high rank."lB

With this approbatlon, newoy b~g.n h1.

oareer.
Dewey set out tor Baltimore to attend the Johns Hopkin.
Univeraity, a achool in complete accord with the spir1t ot the
times.

Or1g1nal work was the keynote.

Student. were not to be

.hac¥led to the past in their inve.tlgat10Ds or in their thought.
President Gilman cODstantly urged upon the students the
teasibility and importance ot original research. The
vory possibility of atudents' doing anything new, anything original, WAS a novol and excltlng ide. to most
ot these young men. l9
For John Dewey the intelleotual horlzon waa opening wider.

aere

in the univer.ity atmoaphere he found the opportunitiea tor intelleotual develop••nt whlch his aurroundings and personal reflectlon
had merely .uggeated.

Here he aaw vlaiona

or

a bright neW world

where-outmoded truth. ot the paat would yleld to new truth.,
truth. oapable ot vivifying a atruggling c1vilization.
It was at Johna Hopkin. that Dewey studied under Protea-

18 Jane Dewey, "B1ography ot John Dewey,"

..........

19 Ibld., 15.

14.

18
lor George 3'. Morris who had made a synthesis or Hegelian idealism

and through whom, atter the soil had been prepared by Torrey,
Hegelianism made its most emphatic impression on Dewey.

Con-

sciously and unconsciously Dewey had been seeking a philosopher
who could satisry his emotions and his intellect.
thought, did just that.

Hegel, he

For "From the idealism of' Hegel • • • he

obtained • • • that fusion of' emotions and intellect f'or which he
had sought unsuccessrully in his boyhood religious experience. H20
Hegel somehow or another supplied a unity in Dewey_ We may suppose
that Hegel's process ot objective evolution or the Absolute was
just the logical explanation of reality that Dewey sought.
thermore, Hegel satisfied Dewey personally.
~ad

Fur-

New England culture

emphasized divisions ot selt trom the world, ot soul trom the

body, and ot nature rrom God.
was a painful oppress10n. 21

For Dewey this extreme diohotomy
Relief was provided by Hegel's

treatment of human culture, a treatment which dismantled the established dividing walls and which consequently satistied and
~ttracted

Dewey.22

To Dewey it seemed that Hegel had faced pre-

Cisely the same problems that now confronted him.
~

Hegel lived in

period of intellectual and social ferment, and, as far as Dewey

~as

~ant

presently concerned, had provided a

pm

.~osophio

system conso-

with the changes taking plaoe in the social order.
20
21
22

Hegel, in

Jane Dewey, "Biography or John Dewey," 17.
Dewey, "From Absolutism to ExperimentaliSM," 19.
Ibid.

,.
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~.

way,

wa~

the oonciliator ot the .ocial and scientitlc.

.ot the same ta.k tor him.elt.

Dewe,

Consequently he sifted the aeSeU..

do•• and caretully analysed what he round.

Uegel held that the

Absolute expressed it.elt In e.erything--indlvlduall and sool.'7,
~ttar
~ive,

and spIrit.

itl moat perteot

palled the atate.
~llm

Secause it wa. e.sentially ruslv. and co1leo~nlteatation

was found in the sooietJ

We ma7 .ay that tnil was one teature ot He,eli-

that never impressed Dewel ravorabl"

espeoially slnoe Hesel

regarded "the twin appearanoes or the Pruaalan atate and ot him.elt a. ita philolopher as
Absolute up to that tlme."23

the moat oomplete maniteatationa ot th4
But tn. empirical application implied

b,. Iiesel, namel,. that a oultural environment .haped "the ide•• ,
belieta, and intelleotual attitudea ot indlVlduall,,,24 va. adopted
~nd

favored by Dewe,..

To explain why Dewey was

10

greatly intluenced by th.

aarman ide.ll_ ot Hegel Is not merell to atri:rm a a1m1lari tf or
temperament.

It 1., howev.r. a queltioR or prlor inrluence.

plac1ng Dewey 1ft a condition receptive ot ideall.m.

Given tne 1n-

fluenoe of Comte Who pOltulated a. h1.torical evolutioa and ot
Buxle7 who provided tn. parallel .volutioD in the human orsaniam,
the b.sio ideal ot Hesel--evolution and organio growth, biololloal

23

Hathanaon,

i2t!!. Dew'!l, 11.

24 Jane Dewey, "Biograph7 ot John Dewe7," 17.
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~rowth

in hi.tory, and an historioal approaoh to history--would

provide a framework for Dewey in his approaoh to the applioation
pt' philosophy to living.

Later Dewey would abandon Hegel.

But he

~ould not forsake the fundamental historioal approach of Uegel. 2$

At this time, Professor Morris, who had introduoed Dewey
~o

~

Hegel, returned to the University of Miohigan.

An ofter

ot

te.ching post there in 1884 ga.e Dewey the opportunity to rejoin

~orris

at Miohigan and continue his personal contaot with the pro-

essor.

While at Michigan, Dewey began his slow separation trom

es&l.

"Oairdts skilltul liberation of the funotion of negatioD

rom entaaglement in the Hegelian dialeotio espeoially influenced
ewey."26

Significantly enough the etfeet of this liberation was

• mmediately exeroised bl" Dewey in his work in ethios.

5£ Ethios, publi.hed

in

.!!!. Studl

1894, illustrate. an almost oomplete

I.paration trom idealism and an espousal in rather rough torm of
1iolog10a1 adaptation.
t~nction
p~l8es

~e

work is based upon the theory that the

ot intelligence is to act as a mediator between human im-

and their consequeno.s--a theory which is in embryo the

heart of his instrumental pragmatism.

And this marked a detini te

2$ ct. Jerome Nathanson, John Dewey, 7 tf: Protessor
believes that aege1 gave Dewey an att1tude more than
p ·inolp1el.
N~thanson

26

Jane Dewey, "Biography of John Dewey," 22.

~------------------------------~
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,..,

change 1n the philosophIcal approach o£ Dewey.
ing less ot a Hegelian and more

or

Be was no becom-

an InatrumeQtal pragmatIst.

MeanwhIle, Dewey had gone to Minnesota tox- a lIhox-t time,
and then he retux-ned to Michigan atter the death ot Morrls.
1n

aut

1894 he s.t out tox- the Universlty of Chioago to j01n hia good

friend and collabox-atox- in the book, Ethics,
James aayden Tufts •
•
Here he tell under the 1nfluenoe ot aeox-ge H. Mead who was pr1ncipally concerned wi ttl tho ettect "at biolog1cal theories upon
acientitic psycholoSy.u27

Mead held that process •• of knowledge

must be oon.idox-ed trom the pOint ot vlew at action and re-actlon

at organiams.

He "started

trom tho idea or the organism aoting

and reacting in an envlronment. n28

Dewey was

theories that they remalned in his mind

80

enamored ot th ...

awaiting the pertectlon

and .cientific explanation Wbicb waa to be amply provided by J....
Mead'. theory was to find its full fruit ln a sc1entltic psycho10glcal explanation given by Jam...
six year. betore the turn ot the

Henoe, it was at thia time,

cent~y

that Devey began to make

expliolt his own doctrine under the influenoe ot Mead which was
modifIed through sub •• quent contact v 1 tb Dal'Win and James.

Up

until thls polnt n.wey vas tor the moat part a Hegelian, wl th

touche. ot the bIological approaoh aroused by Huxl.,.

27

28

Ibid.,
-IbId.,

-

25.
26.

Now Devel

~----------------------------~
~

22
vould turn thoroughl, to Instrumentalls., tbe philosophy that he
vaa to ohampion more or le •• unchanged tor the reat of his 11te.
The oooaslon ot Dewey.s abandoning ot Hegel and espousal
or instrumentalia. was two-told:

tirst, hi. study ot ethios at

Mlchigan whioh was to be oontinued ot neoe.sity over the next
years in oonjunotion wlth a deepening knowledge ot James' psychological approach, secondly, his transrerence to the Universlty ot
ChicaSo where he va. able to put into practloe his ..bryonio
tneories.

Porwhen Dewey vent to Chlcago University ift 1894. he

vas asslgned se.eral courses in ethloa.

TO prepare tor th.se

cour•• s in "psyChological ethlca," "the 10g10 or ethiCS," and
"sooial .thics,"29 he pursued an Inte.sive study ot ethios. ParaDa
with thl. study ot ethics ran the influeno. ot James'

PrinoiRle~

2! PSlchology, "dealina wlth conceptIon, discrlminatlon

&ad oom-

parison, and rea.oning. n30 aere Dew.y found the ••••ntial. ot
the pragmatlc th.ory ot knowledge explained
tollower, Wl11lam Jam.s.

by

Darwin'. ralthful

For a long t1me Dewey bad b••n dissatls-

fled wlth Hegel's tn.sla, antlthesls and sJQtbe.ls.

ae,elts ex-

planation did not ad.quately explain human d.velop••nt, tor Dewey
telt that organic srowib In aature and In indlvlduals .hould 80.ehow provide hi. with a baai. tor a philosophioal approaoh.

29 ...........
Ibid., 32 •
30

Ibid.,
...........

29 •

He

~-----------,
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believed that the ph11o.opher .hould be a part ot nature, 1n
contradi.tinction to Hegel t • • t~eaa on the objeotlv1t, of the
Abaolut. Mind working It. wa, through experl.n•• , almoat independent of Indivldual..

Wherea. Hesel had .tr•••• d the .arob ot th.

Id.a through the world, Dewe, telt that aOlUho., or another the
individual grev and adapted hlmaelt to envlro. .ent 1. a mor. biologioal faahion than wa. manit•• t.d b1 the r.l.ntle •• march 01"
the Abaolu te through. extemal r.a11 t7 •

Pu.l'theftlOre, the hu_ or-

ganla. ahould hay. more control ov.r env1roament than .,a. allowed
it und.r Hegel'. theory 01" the Abaolute Idea.
It wa. at th1a Junoture ·that Wl11ia. Jama.' biolog1 ..l
explanation was to pIa, ita part.

T.he "atream ot oonsolouane •• "

advanc.d b, Jame. provid.d a two-told anaver tor Dewel.

Flr.t of'

all, J .... gave the human parallel to growth &ad contlnuity 1.
Seoondly, this .volutlord.tl0 and biologioal approach ot

nature.

Jamea .....d a 10gloal .xplanatlon ot how the human organia. could
at on.

an<!

the same tlme adJu.t It.elf' to envlroWl'.l81'1t and yet

adapt .nvlronme.t to sati.t, ita

.ONS

needa.

Thought, then, vaa

simpl, explained aa a biological f'uootlon. on. whloh happl17

.noush,

waa parallel &Dd oOlltlnuoul with nature.

Thia could all

be touad adm1rabl, .xpr•••• d b7 Jame. wh•• he had laid,

"!2!

pur-

luance 01" tuture enda and the ohoioe ot ••ana tor th.ir attaInm.nt

t - - -........ -

-

-

-

-

-

................. - - - - -.......-

~.
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phenomenon_«31

consequently there need be no rorced •• lanatioa

ot the unity 1n rea11ty.

Dewey no longer needed the Absolute Id.a

Wb1ch di4 the aynthe.iz1ng in the Hege11an aoheme.
doning th1s reature
approaoh

or

or

Wh1le aban-

aegel he could at1ll retain the hiatorical

Hegel which be round so congen1al.

All mantal aotivi-

ty could be explained now by the almost automatic reaction
organ1.m 1n the concrete 81tuat1on.
type

or

react10n to env1ronment.

or

tbe

Intel11gence waa simpl, a

Ita dlatinctive trait 18 that it

alway. take. Into con.iderat1on ruture r.aulta or oon••quence ••
At thls tlae, tortunately enoUSh ror Dewe"

the Univer-

aity of Chicago Included pedagoSl in tbe department or Pbilosoph7
and Psychology_
knOWD

So Dewey was able to rorm what was popularly

.a the "Dewey Scbool, ff but which he called, not without

accuracy, "The Laboratory SOhool."32

Add to the Influence ot

James, experimentally ver1tied by teach1ng in the Laboratory
School and by the atudy and teaohing ot ethiC., the 1ntluence ot
hia experienc •• in the .oc1al .ettlement, Hull HOUS8, and you have
Dewey 1n hls almost tinal torm--convinced now that knowledge can
be explained

biologl.ally. convinced alIa that knowledgahaa a.

1nstrumental value; and In debt to the b1olog1oal prlnoiples ot
31 William J .... , !he pr1nole1 •• ot PS10hololl, N.w
York, HeDr1 Holt and 00., Vol:-!, 1890, 8. ItaLicI In original.

32 Jane Dewel, "B1ograpb70t John Dewey," 27-28.

~.
-~---------------------------------------------------------------,

2$

lame. tor tfte explanation. 33
The Idea ot the toundre •• ot Hull Hou.e, Jane Add... ,
was that not only the underprivlleged, but the wealthy and cultured people anould share In learnlng that "democraoy 1a a way ot
lIte, the truly moral and human way ot 11te."34

Contaot with Hull

Houa. kept Dewey'a mind toau •• d along .oclologloal 11nes.

Here he

could see 1n the concrete the worklng out ot inltrumental pragmatiam.

H1a oontact with the problema ot the world, a. alwaYl,

was tor h1m a atep 1n the more exact tormulation ot the function
and nature ot philoaophy.

One more power ot Influence remalned,

and that waa to be telt ahortly.
Prom the Unlverslty ot Chicago Dewey went to Columbla
1n 1905 where he came in contact with F. J. E. Woodbr1dge and
lived In another new phllosophical atmosphere.

Realiam wa. abl,.

represented br Woodbridge, "a thorough classical and Aristotellan
acholar, and an orig1nal and Itimulating teacher ot the hlatorr ot
philoaophr."3S

Woodbridge led Dewey to examine Aristotle and the

philosophy of the Greeka.

33

ne

became convinced through hia

Cf. Philip P. Wiener, Evolution and the Foundera ot

pra~tlam., "Darwiniam 1n Jame. t PsychologY' anCf1i'ragm.tl.m, w 97::l28~or a detailed explanat10n ot the influence ot Darwin and

Jam.. on instrumentalis••

.34 Jane DeweY', "BIography ot John Dewey," 29.
35

-Ib1d.,

35.
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.tud1 ot hlitorJ that the history ot ph11osoph7 provided a praot1ca l ver1fioatlon ot hls instrumental pragmatlsm.
~th

Dlsousslona

Woodbrldge made "thelr 1ntelleotual as.oclatlon or pecullar

importanoe In further developlng Dewelts thought.")6

In thla ea-

ylronment Dewey oontlnued to work out his philosophio Ideas.
in the light or past history.

BOW

We may a-y that In the •• day.

newey was able to work out an apologia ror hi. philoaophy_
On the sooial level, too, lew York took up where Ohioago
had lett ort.

Dewel could not help but be interested In "the

aoute contlict existlng between polltloal and aoolal demooracy and
lrreaponalbl. tlnance oaplt&1Ia•• "31

ne translated inter.s. lato

actlon by enter1ng polltlos, jolning the La Follette oampalgn •
• spouaing woman suttrase, ADd beoomlng a oharter member ot the
Teaohera unIon.38
oonsoioua.

A wide apan ot aotlv1tie8 kept hi. 8001al17

Whereas In Ohioago he had witnes8ed the change and

grovth ot 11te acoompanying the r1a. ot induat."

In Rev York he

aav the tlnancial baokground mak1as growth poaalble. Both ot theae
taotora he atud1ed in their relat10na to cODcrete ao01al oondltl0.
and in relat10n to the praotlcal attitude. ot mind whioh brought
about the auec ••• ot the young America •

-IbId., .39.

.36 Ibid., .36.
.31
.38

-Ibld.

-
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Over the years Dewey had done a great deal of travelling
in foreign countries.

To take one typioal example, a trip to

China strengthened I)ewoy in hIs desire to forsake anything that
was absolute, not because it was absolute, but because it belonged to a past o1v1llzatlon--one

complet~11

and radlcally dit-

ferent trom his own world.
The change trom. the United states to an environment of

the oldest culture in the world struggllng to adjust
itself to new condition8 was so great as to act as a
rebirth ot intellectual enthusiasms. It provided a
living proot ot tht value or social education as a
means ot progress. J9

It was becoming more and more clear to him. that old ideas were
useles8 ideaa.

They could not keep pace with a changing world.

If they could not tran8form and asslst the ohanging world, then
those ideas must be rejected.
1n one of the oldeat.

He had proof in a young country and

"Nobody cared for the customs and culture

ot the past, and everyone believed
would be rapld. n40

.3 •

~hat

progress was

ce~ta1n

and

SUMMARY

As haa be.n mentioned, Dewey, in retrospect, admitted
the 1.n1"luence tha t phIlosophers had on hlm.

.39

40

-IbId., 42 •

It was not alwaya a
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.tr1ct chrofiologlcal Influence.

Aa the problem.

0. . .

up, DeweT

recalled hls readlng, h1s personal contaot., his earlJ mentora,
and concrete conditions.

When he rethought hi. philo.oph,.. be

would piece together the answer. provIded b1 other philosophera.
llis very fir.t philo.ophic intel'est stimulated bl Comte and
ley indioated a pattern.

nux-

newel's philosophic taste had started

with an intere.t In 8001al oondition. and all other taotor. influenced him along that llne and onlr in as muoh a8 the,. were able
to do somethlng In concrete ciroumstances.

Thia demanded, there-

tore, flrst an explanation and then a working out at the explanation.

Dewey had suspeoted that a. the world grew, ao did the

human organism.

Sillee the organl.m was part of realit,., it should

have th. sam. charaoteri.tlc•• Comte and Huxley had long ago pro-

J....

vided the beginning ot an an.wer.
oal approach.

Head and

biological adaptation.

aegel had supplied the histori-

supplied the lull-blown theory ot

Woodbridge had acquainted Dew., with the

history ot Philosoph,., a hiatorr that a.emed replete with examples

ot the tailure

01"

philosophy to grow and advano. with the sooial

milieu preoise17 because ot the abaence ot any understanding ot
the true nature of realitr and of biolog1cal adaptat1on.

All

Dewel'a experienoea at subsequent years had mere11 d•• pened and
made more articulate hi. first phllosophic f.elings.

Persona,

readings, refleotlon, sooial condItions had all Joined handa to
give Dewe1 an instrumental pragmatism, at the basi. ot

~1oh

li8.
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a theor1

ot~truth

generated 1t.

Intrlnslcal17 bound up wIth the Intluences that

It 1s to that theor7 ot truth that we now turn.

CliAPTER -III

NOTION OF TRUTH IN JOHN' DEWEY
1.

DEl-/EY'S NOTION OF TRUTH IN

Ul:lU~nAL

Thre. major diffioulti.1 contront anyone who would attempt to dllcover JUlt what John Dewe7 meana by truth.

First ot

all, despite the fact that DewIJ's notion ot tl'uth haa re_inod
rairlr conltant through his seventy-tlve 1GAr. of writing, there
haa been 80me moditicatlon over the years.

From 1911, when Dewe,

wrote an article tor the Weekly aeview ot the Universlty or Penn.ylvania entitled "The Problem at Truth," untll the appearance ot
hl. tlnal and deflnitive work, LeSie:

~

tneorl

2!

ln~ulrz,

which appeared in 1'38, there haa been a growth in Dew8Y'. though
Varioua booka throughout this period repre.ent this growth at Its
various stages.

The Inve.tlsator haa the oholce ot rollowing the

gene.ls ot the growth ot truth as such or contining hl. ettort.
flr.t to the predominant phllosophioal and non-phllosophloal attitude. that have intluenced Dewel. and then to the precl.e expres.
alon ot thi. influenoe 1n hla tinal work.

Because Dewe1 wlshe. to

hold tirmly only the poaitlon atated In hi. last work, our ettorts
have taken the .eoond alternatlve.

In vlew or what Dewe1 exp11cl

11 .tate. In the pretace ot hl. LeSlc, the prude.t Inv•• tlgator
)0
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11111 b. to1lowlng hi. mind moat clo. e11 1n pr-opor-t1on a. he tallows
and .tudi •• the notlon ot truth aa pre.ented In Logic:

-

ot Inqulrl-

ot thIs work and ita relation to hls phllosoph,. Dewe,.

,a18 :

!bla book is a develop.ent ot Id.a8 regarding the nature
at logioal tneor,. that were tlrst presented. 80mo tort1
1ears ago, In Studle. !!. Lolioa1 Theorl' that wer• • omevba t expanded In Is.aiS In perl.enta lfofl c and ve"
brier1,. summarlzea vI
iPeolat r-eterenoe 0 education
In How We Thiak. Whl1e basic Ideas reaal11 the same,
ther. has natura11,. betD conslderable modiflcation durlng
th. Intervening ,.••rs.
Theretor., when retePenc•• are _de to other works, the •• reterenee. shall be on17 to teatures whioh h.ve not b••n changed b1
Dewey's 1•• t positlon_
The •• cond. dlff10ulty taclng the lnve.t1s.tor- 1. the tact
that o.ve,. va. reluotant to ue. the term. "truth."

Consequentl,..

he ..ployed .everal equivalent term. to eliminate the poa.lbillt,.
at belng oon.idered •• Juat another- phl10soph.r In accord wIth
trad1tloDal philosoph,._

Close on th. h•• ls ot thls J:l"oble. ls

the thlrd d.1ttlcult1. which 1. Devel's 1nolu.ion ot truth and Its
equIvalent terae In hle explanatlon ot the problem ot knowledge.
In other worde. 11ke the poteherds ot the archaeologist, Dewo7'S
theor,. ot tNth must be dlsentanal.d tor Ita eurround1nge--a proJect not alva,.8 e.sy_
1

Deve,., LogiC, 111.

12

.

1ft making the tranal tlon f'ro. envlr-onmeBt to mowIe dge

to tNth Deweyts general concept of' truth 1. tar dltteHnt trom
tI:1. tradlt10nal and clear cut conoepts at 10glcal, ontologlcal,

and moral truth.
tinsul.h.

When Dew.7 treats at truth, he do•• not d1.-

Hl. truth 1. so.ething taken f'rom 11ve sltuatloD. and

whiGh ultImately atf'ects aotion aad shap•• eventa. !ruth 1. a
general t.~ tor Dewe7, a. he adudta. 2 A••ar17 a. 1925 Dev.,.
had b.gun to make olear aad preclse the general notIon at truth.
Sometlme. the us. at the word "truth" 1. oonflned to
de.ignatlng a 1081081 propertf ot propo.ltional but 1t
we extend It ••1gnif'lcan.e to de.lgnate the charaoter,ot
exl.t.ntlal ref'erenoe. this is the mea_ina of' truth.
pro •••••• of' chan,•• 0 dlrected that th.l aObleve an
intended oon.ummation.3
Con.equentll, the ,eneral notion ot tNth for Dewe,. ls 1dentlt1ed
with .uocesstul aot1v1t,..

But thl ••ucce ••tul aotlvlt,. It.elt

i. ident1f1ed w1th knowledge and therefore knowl.dge would be a
term .qulvalent to tNth, tor knowle4ge 18 the 010 •• at Inquir,..
the attaiam.nt of truth.4

2 "On the one hand, truth le eo_th1ng which characteri ••• Id.a., th.ori •• , bJPoth•••• , b.liet., judgmenta, propositlon., a •• ertlons, .to. • •• Thi. 1. an intelliglble and to .e
the onlf intelligible .en.e at the tePa truth." John Dewe"
ftae.lit, and the CriterloD tor the Truth ot Idea.,n Mlad, Ju17,
1907, N. S. XVI, 333.
---) Joha Devey, Bx6erlenoe and Hatu.e, Wev York,
lorton & Oompany, Ino., 19~, 160. ---

w. w.

4 "The word kRowle~e 1s al.o a sultable term to de11saate tne obJeotive o%o.e a Inqu1~. But 1t, too, .utte~s
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In this process ot equivalatlns truth to knowledge and
knowledge to the end at inquiry, Dewe, adela another raetor.
make. knowledge equal to warranted aaaertion.

ae

"Knowledge," he

aaya, "1n it. atrict.st and most honoritio aena. Is warranted a.sertion.";

warranted a88ertibillty i. the term moat frequently

used by Dewe,. In.tead ot tbe word "tputh."

He ohooae. thi. tel'll

because he t.ela that It 1. tree tram amblgu1ty.6
What, thea, 1. the .trlct meanlns ot the term "warraated
.aaert1blllty?"

Dewey anawer. slowly.

When knowledge la taken a. a geaeral .bstract term related
to Inquiry In the ab.tract, It meana "warranted ••••rtlblllt7." Tne use ot a term that de.lgn.te •• potentlality
rather than an actuallty Involv•• recognltlon that .11
apeclal conclu810ns ot speclal inquirle. are parte ot an
enterprlle that 1s cont1nually renewed, or 18 a 101nS
coneem. l
And 11ke • go1ng oonoern, to carr1 out the met.phor, truth 18 •
kind ot settlement

~ch

the 8ame a. the resolving ot problema

trom ambigulty. Wb.e. 1t Is 8.1d th.t .tta1JU1.ent ot kaowledge, or
tNth, ls the end at i.quirl, th • • tate.nt aooor<11n8 to the
po.itlon here taken, 1. a truI.m." Dewey, Lo,ie. 7-6.

S Ibid., 143.

-

vb,..

6 "What ha. b.en .ald help. to explaIn
the tePm
'warranted a •• ertion' i . preterred to the t.rm. b.liet and know~
l.dge. It 1. tree tro. the amblgul t7 ot the.e l~··f!fU.·~:"d
IT"'I'i...ol ..... peter.nce to Inqull'J a. that which ,~at.'=as..~~.~n.
.ill..!!., 9. Italica 1n orlg1nal.
II.L,f~·~~:JL'~r\
. \
7 ~ •• 9.
\
... ,1... ....... . )
"'.. L· ,... ,., /' Cl''''\ / /
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that goes on dally In everyone'a personal exp.rlence.

And like

11te itself, truth 1. not .erely one succes.tul operatIon, but
rathor the accumulation ot resolved situatIons.

!hough It 1. ac-

curate to .ay that truth I. In Individual .ettlement. ot .ltu.tbn,
It 1. more accur.te to S.1 that truth 1. rather in a prooess, just
a. lIte it.elf doe. not consl.t ot an Instant or actIvIty, but of
a flow ot actIvity_

For this reason Dewe,'s theory ot truth Is

rather a desor1pt1on of suc.e •• tul activity, be It In a p.rtlcul.r
or 1n • gener.l lIne.

T.bu., •• H. S. T.hayer remarks:

What 1. ordInariI, called. ·'true atate.nt, tf Dewey calls
a warranted ••••rtion. And wh.t 1. usually call.d •
theory ot truth, tor Dew.y conatitute• • de.criptlon and
acoount ot tno.e exi.tenti.l oond1tions and the operat10••
p.rformed th.t s.n.r.te w.rr.nted ••••rtlona. 8
lIenee there are v.lld reasons behind a warranted assertion.

The

conolusion i8 warranted bec.use ot certain con.equence. th.t
ensue. conaequence. wh1ch vilidate the a ••• rtlon.
StIll
truth In the

Oft

the level of general desorlption, we turn from

cODc~ete

to truth In the abstraot where we fInd

Dewey making a dl.tlnctlon between truth and valIdIty.
tnere 1 • • dlstinotlon made In m7 theory between valIdity
and truth. The latter 1. dotlned., followIng Pell'ce, as
the Ideal limit of Indefinltel7 continued inquIry- Tbis
detlD1tlon Is, ot cours., a defInition of truth a. an

--

~.>
c: T .Ci \,.y f:' l ...
\

/~.~')'

8 H. S. Thaler, !be Lo&1c
The
_nU1es Pre... 19$2.""O!;.
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.

\
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praeb!s.# We" York,
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abstract;,idea. 9
Tbus, when Dewey distingulsh •• between validlty and truth, he
make. a distinctlon 1n the abstract order.

But When this ab-

.tract truth becomes workable In concrete c1rcumstance., valldity
and truth are 1dent1cal.

The abstract truth 1s a _an. for con-

crete value, namely that it resolv.s a partlcular sltuatlon.
Dewel wanted no part of 1de.s or things alone, dl.connected tram
tbelr envlronment.

He did not want to abstraot.

ide.s bad value or truth onll In

lie felt that

.0 far .s they affeoted soclal

oondl tlona.
From thia coollderatlon ot truth In general and elpeclally In the terma equ1valent to It, we Ie. two thlnsa:

(1)

truth 1a found 1n concrete .ituatlonl, (2) it con.lsts of the
lucce.atul resolutlon or I.ttle..nt of those concrete situatlons.
Precisely becau.e of the dlnaml0 nature of live sltuatlons, Dewe7
perforce cannot do more than .erely sugge.t the general nature ot
truth.

At thll polnt It becomel necel.u7 to desoribe truth, to

tell what qualltles 1t exhibits by Its pre ••nce In existentlal
condlt10ns and operationl.
John Dewel, "Experlenoe, Knowledge and val~e," !.he
';~' ed. Paul A. Schllpp, Evanaton, Rort'li=
unlVi'riilty,
, S12. Itallcs In orlginal.
9

~bllosophy
~elt.rn

ot John
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2.

mE QUALITIES OF TRUm

It la quite clear that ainoe truth ls taken from experience on the 8trictly empirioal level, truth will have to as8ume some aort ot pragmatic 8hape.
works.

It will have to be that which

Now that whioh works i8 that Which may be verified.

Renae

Dewey aays that conception8 must be verifled in experience. lO
1he firat quality of truth, then, is that it work or provlde a
Ii? ,'/'f
solution to a problem. ~~. 1s something which not 80 muoh merely

answers a question, but rather provides a 80lution to a practical
problem.
truth.

When an idea or conoeption solves a problem, there is
And only that which has been proved to be a satisfactory

answer to a problem i8 warrantably assertible.

"For it is that

idea, whioh reflectlon and experlment terminating in judgment have
verified as a solution to a problem, that is warrantably assertible. "11
/7

;'

r10 LAflt is therefore in submitting conception8 to the «m

trol of experienoe, in the process ot verifying them, that one
finds examples ot what is called truth. Theretore, any philosopher
who applies this empirical method without the least prejudlce In
tavor ot pragmatic doctrine, can be lead to conclude that truth
'means' verification, or it one preters, that verlflcation, either
actual or pos8ible, is the definition ot truth~~JOhn Dewey,
Phl10S0~hl and Civilization, New York, M1nton;-saloh & Company,

It))I,

z. 11

Thayer, LoSic

~

PraseatisM, 68.

~~------------~
J

37

,

!he seoond quality of truth is found in Peiroe's detinition, a definition aooepted by Dewey-

Peiroe had held that
J,-,}'"

~ruth_..:k'a type ot voyage. a tending toward S0ll'1ethins.12 ~th:,
thuS beoomes a progressive actIon, and while It i8 progressive,
it is neoessarily unstable.

We have what may be termed partial

truths whioh have their value only beoause of the process of investigation and inquiry wniCh they help to terminate successtully.
Theretore, these "partial truth." are

t~e

subsequently.

Because

they have helped reach a warranted assertion, they are true.

B7

no stretCh ot the imagination are they true in themselves, antecedent to use.

Obviously this tollows trom the oonoeption ot

truth as a voyaging, for travel Is only suooesstully terminated
when it is finished, and the stages of the journey have their
only in

80

tar as they have helped reach the goal.

va~

For example,

the general and abstract conceptions of truth, beauty, and goodness have a real value tor inquiry, tor oreation, and tor conduct.
;y/J-

;07/.

12 (Truth is that oonoordanoe ot an abstract statement
wi th the ideal lim! t towards which endless investigation lfoul~
teridto brlng soientlfic belle[) which ooncordanoe the abstraot
statement may possess by virtue ot the oontesslon ot its Inacouraoy and one-sidedness, and thls contesslon Is an es •• ntlal
Ingredient ot truth." Charles S. 'eirce, Collected pa!ers ot
Oharle. Sanders PeIrce, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Pau ;elii,
~ambrldge, Harvard University Pre.s, 1931-1935. vol. 5, Paragraph

565 .
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!beY have

a~d1rective

force. l )

But 1f the.e concepts are direc-

tive and are reminders "of the concrete conditions and operat1ona,
thel too will have their truth only in so far a. they sat1at7
actual case., 1n other words, in so far as they constitute vital
parts of the voyage.

In our very setting out we are making an

effort to achieVe truth, and we attain a sufficient degree of 1t
to modify favorably our circumstances here and now.
The third quali ty of fI"U~!l_is that it must succeaUlhlll'_
submit to the crucial test ot Circumstance., a qualIty which has
been suggested above.

T...,"

~h~ust

have a definite relation to a

concrete Situation, the specific requirement being that it prove
of worth in that situation.

There can be no quest10n at a merely

abstract, Iso1ated, independent truth. for
Truth and falaitl present them8elves a8 signlficant facta
0i1l in situatIons In whlon s~ecItlc meanln,. and £hell"
a rea~ eXierienced-rultllmen s and non-rut Iliinta are
Intent ona Il oomSared and contriitea-wi£fi reterence~
the ~estlon of re worW, a8 to ri1iamTtl
meant,
O'r"te given iiiiaiiIiig or claiS or l1leanl!!i8. • :-. TrUt
I i an-experlencea rel~ton or tniOg8, and it has no
,_,meaning outside of such relation • .L.ij.

or

13 "But in order to exercise their genuine function
they must be taken as reminders of the concrete condit10ns and
operations that have to be satisfied in aotual cases. In .erving
as such generalized instruments their meaning is exemplified in
further use, ~ll. it is also clar1fied and modified in this
use." Dewey, 1061c, 176.

14 John Dewel, The Influence of Darwin on Phl108ophl,
New York, Henry Holt and co:; 1910, 9S. -rtal!c8 in-original.

~~------------~
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Note

the words "fulfilment8, non-fulfilment8, que8tion of the

worth, experienced relation of thing8."
only of empirical te8ting.

Here there i8 question

An experienced fulfilment, then,

would be one where an idea is tested in concrete surroundings.
A non-fulfilment would simp17 mean that the idea had not worked.
No one could question this theory if it were confined
to hypothe.e. alone, tor all men will admit that the knowledge ot
many truths is developed by testing.

The ramitioations of one

truth are enlarged over the centuries--more in some briet periods
than in others--and this development takes place precisely because of submitting h7Pothese8 to tests.

For example, the atoRdc

theory began with general truths, detioient because ot the small
progress in scientitic tields.

As time went on, more knowledge

was had ot what scholastics would call the ontological truth ot
the atom.
tested.

As tacts and soience advanced, eaoh new h7Pothesis was
Succesltul testing relulted in the elaboration and de-

velopment ot the atomio theory from it. gEneral truth to the many
partioular truths that provide the atomic bomb.

Where there is

question ot working on hypotheses, there is always the possibility
of later truth contradicting prior hypotheses.

Dewey, however,

generalizes a 8tatement which i8 true for the 8trictly empirioal
truth built on h7Pothe8es, and he fully intends that this generalization apply to all truth.

~------------------J..'-'~~
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This submission ot truth to a testing in the existential
order is an important aspect ot truth in the light
been said in Chapter II.

or

what has

It gives us the tourth quality ot truth,

namely, that it be conditional, tor Dewey's concern tor truth rose
trom social conditions, and he was Vitally concerned with the
solution ot concrete problems.

The important teature here i.

not so much the solution of the problem, but rather the objective
growth and change that truth undergoes from the influence ot the
problem itselt.

The general nature of truth, admittedly, remains

constant, namely that it be a solution

~o

a problem.

But in the

concrete conditions, truth necessarily becomes a temporary phase
of a particular solution, tor when the problem changes, the
solution is altered.

~~~;'i7~h is essentially conditional. It

is clear that a particular settlement will remain true only it
the objective conditions in which it was achieved are completely
and accurately reduplicated.

And even in that case, extraneous

factors may make the previously valid settlement presently invalid.

This conditional quality ot truth tollows 10g1cally upon

Dewey's agreement with Pierce's detinition ot truth as a voyaging,
and is insisted upon by Dewey.1S
IV

t,~

: 1."

t}

t..!

15 {~e;lsett1ement~ ot a particular situation by a
particular inquiry is no guarantee that that settled conclusion
remain settled • • • • there is no belief so-iettled as not to be
exposed to further inquiry;!j Dewey, The Intluence ot Darwin on
Philosoehy, 8.
"
-----
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Given thia general nature and theae esaential qualitiea

ot truth, the question immed1ately arisea:

By what meana ia

truth to be found?

3.

THE PROCESS OF INQUIRY

The process of inquiry, together with all ita constitutive parts and functions, is the means conceived by Dewey aa
necessary for determining a situation, that is, for solving a
problematic situation or providing a settlement.
ahieved is, of course, truth.

The result

Dewey tells us that:

Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation ot
an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate
in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elemenits of the original situation into a
unitied whole.· 6
This "unified whole" ot which Dewey speaks is the settled conclusion,the one that here and now provides an answer.
terminates in reaching that which i8 settled."17

"Inquiry

From the gener-

al nature ot truth, the terminus of inquiry is a conclusion that
is relatively settled, settled
is concerned.

as~r

a8 the truth of the moment

"The 'settlement' of a particular situation by a

-

particular inquiry is no guarantee that that settled conclusion

16

Dewey, Logie, 104-105.

17

-Ibid.,

7.

r:-------------,
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remain settled. n18
It the end

ot inquirY' is the relativel.,. settled con-

clusion, the condition ot inquirY' is an indeterminate situation-a practical problem that needs aolution. 19
calls the "Problem-Solution."

This is what DeweY'

Given a praotical problem, the in-

dividual maY' put the process of inquiry to work.
in inquiry will be very p.. ctical.

Tbe procedure

"The first step then is to

search out the constituents of a given situation whioh, as constituents, are settled. H20

For example, when a fire alarm is

sounded, the indeterminate ia the procedure necessary to produce
a favorable outcome.

The determinate qualities are that the fire

is looated somewhere; the aisles and exits are at fixed places.
"Since they are settled or determinate in existence, the first
step 1n institution ot a problem ia to settle them in obaerva.
tlon."21

The problem-situation ia approached without prejudice.

Then the mind reaaona on poaaible ways of solving the determinate
problem and tinally proceeds to put the "facta-meaning"22 into
operation.

The success or truth of the outcome 1s determined

18

19
20

21
22

Ibid. ,
-Ibid.
,

8.

Italics in original.

-Ibid. , 105.
108-109.
-Ibid.,

-Ibid. ,
-

Ital. ios in original.

109.

Italics 1n original.

112.

The terms are obvious.

~------------~
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when the final conclu.ion "aotually functions."2)
Like truth itself, the ma1n quality of the process ot
inquiry, both

~n

particular and in general, i. that 1t be pro-

gressive and oumulative. 24

Like the method ot arriving at truth

it is a gradual, controlled prooess.

The control of inquiry is

dependent upon a knowledge ot the kinds of inquiry that have and
have not worked.

By comparison-contrast the individual find.

out how and Why other inquiries have tailed to provide truth. 25
The very failure. of other inquiries should so oontrol later inouiries that individuals will be kept from error.

Naturally

this involves a continuity from tne past to the present
to the future.

thr~ugh

Therefore, in addition to being progressive and

oumulative, the prooes8 ot inquiry is continuous.
This notion of oontinuity in Dewey is one of the simplest yet most diffioult concepts to grasp.

It is a theory that

he derived from the biological naturalism ot James, and which h.
explains, for the most part, by comparison.

"The growth and de-

velopment of any living organisM trom seed to maturity il1usstrat •• the meaning of oontinuity.H20

The comparison, while si

23

~.,

24

Ibid., 311.

25

Cf. LogiC, 104, for the process involved.

26

~.,

110.

23.

~-.- - - - - - - ,
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18 not too rntormative.

This much, however, is certain.

Dewey the continuous and the relational are the same.

For

In other

words, Dewey atfirms that a new situation is continuous with a
previous situation from Which it results.

A oontinuity, like

physioal growth and development, should be present in the prooe ••
of inquiry_

One partioular process ot inquiry is actually a part

of a general prooess of inquiry; the relation is so intimate that
the whole process of inquiry, progressive and cumulative as it i8,
ls oontinuous.

It the process of inquiry is continuous, it is only so
because nature itself is continuous.

The continuity of natw:-e is

the source of the continuity ot inquiry, knowledge and truth.

Hence nature, we might say, bestows some of its oontinuity on
rational operation as a cause upon an effeot.

th~

"tContinuity"n

Dewey tells us, "means that rational operations grow

~

of

organiC aotivities, without being identical with that from which
they emerge."27

This biological supposition of the oontinuity of

nature itself, aocepted by Dewey through the influenoe ot Comte,
ID~ley,

and James, demands that the nature being aoted upon in

th~

prooess ot inquiry oontinue in the rational order its own organic
continuity_

As Feldman hold., suoh an assumption tends to a hasty

and a dogmatio unifioation which could lead to a blindness to the

27

ill!!.,

18.
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actual diver_tty of concrete reality.28

Dewey, however, was con-

,ciOUI of this problem and obviated the danger by making the the0rf

ot continuity work two waya. 29 The human organism and the thinking processea, specifically the process of inquiry, refleot nature

which in itselt is oontinuous.

But the oontinuity of the rational

order is in lome way independent of the continuity in nature,
,ince the rational has its own oontinuity Which saves it from
bGing swallowed up in the continuity of nature.

Protessor Wood-

bridge describes it well.

If we are unstable, there is instability in it; it we
are contradictory, there i. contradiotion in it; it we
are hopeful, there is possibili ty--one 1111ght dare to say,
hope--in it; it we err, there is something like error in
it; 1t we are inoomplete, there is inoompleteness in it.30
This reflective a.nd yet independent continuity seems to be the
interpretation which Dewey himself would favor, for in Experience
and Nature he says:
Trai ts of refleotion are as truly indica.tive or evidential
ot the traita ot other thinga as are the traits ot theae

28 W. T. Feldman, The PhilOSO~hl ot John Dewel. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Pre ss;-I934 , 81- 8. -----29 "It is important to observe that Dewey works his
'oontinuity' in both directiona. Sometimes he starts with qualitie. or prooesses tound in 'lower-level' phenomena, in inanimate
objeot. or in living but unconscious, or non-reflective, organisMS;
at other times, he starts trom the other end, and reads back into
pre-human nature those characters ot human experience which were
tormerly regarded as diatinctively mental." Ibid., 88.

-

30 F. J. E. Woodbridge, "Experienoe and Dialectio,"
Journal £! PhilosophZ. XXVII, 1930, 269.
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events. ~ •• The world must actually be suoh as to
generate ignorance and inquIrYJ doubt and bypoth.sl.;
trial and temporal conclusions.31
Thi. sImple and lIteral explanation--that as nature and the organism are continuous, 80 1. inqulrJ--•• ema to be the most logical
explanatIon of Dewey'. meaning.

Material continuity such that

inquiry would be Identical with nature i8 diffioult botb to underatand and explaln.32
A oorollary ot the theory ot continui t1 is Dewel' s s tres.
on the hazards ot inquiry.

preoisely becau.e ot the growth,

change, and instabl1lty ot reality, thougnt, since lt will alway.
be dealing wlth a truly unique situatlon, ls alw81s fraught with
hazard.3)
why

Thls turther charaoteriatlc ot inqulry explains well

truth mat be proviaional.

31

Dewey, Experience

'fo achieve truth general rule.
~

Nature, 68-69.

32 ot. Peldman, Philosoph, ot John ~.y. 89. Here he
apeaks ot the "ldentit, t1Pe or oont nuIt~
• type would be
hard put to explaln how "an aot ot rerlective thought i. a 'projeotion, continuation, or oomplication ot astronoDdoal phenomena
(an example), or in what ••n•• the movement. ot the electron within the atom are a P1"ototJPe ot the poetio i.aSinings ot a oreatlve
artlst."
)) "Just becaus. the retlective agent is always tlnding
In tnew' situationa, he oan never 801v8 hl. pre.ent probleme merely on the ba.i. of general rule. which have been developed
trom past slmilar experience.. !bl. argument trom 'the uniquenes.
~t every experienoed situatIon' inaists upon the provisional
character of all general rule. and princ1ple •• " Feldman, Philo.oehl. !! John Dewey, 7.
~iM.elt

r;=------------,
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;,

~1oh

have been previously .atabliahed muat aubm1t and re-aubmit

to test ••
Their applicabllltl and adequaoJ must be tested and
ret.sted, and no matter how suooesstully they may stand
up agalnst tne challenge or new clroumstanoe., tho,
must be held onll tentativelf and subject to revialon
or reJlption, when they oan no longer be made to tl t the
tacts.~

Hence, nature itselt, 1n oonstant tlux, demands that great oare
be u.ed In the prooes. ot Inquirf.

To tollow the tendenCl on the

part ot men to take truth. whloh were adequate in the past a. true
and acourate settlements ot new situationa would be to tall to

realize the ••••ntlall, hazardous nature ot the prooe.s ot inqu1r1.
~us

tar w. have been conalderlng the nature ot inqulry

In Itself and In It. e •• ential qualitlea.

Tbere are .till two

more iaotors whioh tall under the general category ot the means to
obtain truth.
process

or

The tirst ot th.se 1s the agent through whioh the

inqulrr tak•• plao., namely Intelligenoe.

It ia from

the function as.i&Ded to intelllgenoe that Oewel takes his unu.ual
ooncept ot truth.3S

For Dewe" intelllgence, diatlnsulahing man

trom animal., i. the prlmary factor le.aening chanoe and complete
hazard In the precarious state ot exlstence.

Rea.on, utIl1zlng

34 Ibid.
35 "But the e.sential pOint or pragmatism 1s that it
baaes ita ehansed aocount ot truth on a changed conoeption or the
nature or intelligence." Dew.." M1nd, 325.

-

-

--
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the proo ess ot ;nquiry, dimini.h.a hazard and alda In ordering an
,.ouring the good things at lito.

All men muat have raith 1n tbe

oapacitJ ot the intelligence to organize the wlld and alien mate~ial. ot the world.

This 1. ita proper tunotlon.J6

Intelllgenoe

take. the raw material. of I1te and uses thea. tor a detinite

.nd.

That end 18 to be aomething practioal, the answer to a prob

I.matlc situation.

Conaequentl"

intelligence " ••lze. on, orga-

niz.a, direot. and transto:MI.I thole parta ot experienoe whioh are
relevant to the lecuring ot ao.e delIberate, planned outco.e-lome conaummator, end-In-Yiew."37

Dewe, conceived ot the Inteu~

as limited to practloal and partioular knowledge wlth definite
praotioal ends In view.

"Intelligence,· he ob.erved, "operate.

onll in partIcular juncture. ot experience in which probl ...
demandlng action arl.e."38
joined to experIence.

Intolll,enoe, tor him, i. alwal.

It work. with experience on nature.

It 1.

"the purposerul enersetic re-anaper ot tho.e pha.e. ot nature and
11te that obstruct soolal well-belng."l9
The .econd of the tlnal tactors talling under the olae-

36 "Intelligenoe i . tne human weapon by which the
es.entiale or 11r. are carved trom the world." Tbarer, Lesie
pt-apatism, 18.
31
38
39

-

Ibid.

Ibid.., 6.
-Dewel,
Reconstruction,
b

$1.
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Jification at the mean. to obtain truth is experienoe, wIth which

.nd in wt11ch intelligenoe operates.

Experienoe tor Dewe, means

.any things, but considered a. a maans to obtain truth 1n tn.
tramework of the proce.s ot inquiry under the agenoJ ot tne int.lligence it i. "the interaotion ot organism and environment, reJulting in loae adaption whloh aeour•• utilIzation ot the
latter • • • • "40

Every living organi.m, consequently, 18 inter-

aoting with environment.

But man,

a.

the highe.t ot organl.s,

retlne. experience, makIng It .erve .om. partIcular purpo.e.
Henoe It i8 only the interaotion ot organi •• and environment,
and experience, that the end ot Inquirl, truth, oan be obtained.
As Dewe1 ••18, "It i . quite obviou8 that experienoe, a. an ongoing aftair between live oreatures and their enVironments, prov1de. the only aooe •• and meane to what can be known about

nature • • • • ~l

And .inoe experienoe i. the onll door to nature,

everything must b. submitted to experience, tor experience opens
the way to that wh10h oan be known a. well .a the method
knowing.

or

Such a method, saya Dewel, 1s one wh1ch baa reapeot tor

experience.
With so great a streas on experienoe and such autonomJ
the part or intelligenoe In the prooe •• ot

~~n.quir7,

i'':'

;;,~
:~

40 Ibid., 81.
41

-

so
bUrns his last.,orldge allowing escape froDl pras-ti8Dl.

Log1oally

tolloving his ear11er postulates, he denies that there is Any eu
thing .a 1mmediate knowledge which could be a condition or cause

ot other knowledge.42

POI'

Dewey and empirioists 1n seneral sens.

data are the on11 thIngs immediately known.

"Empl:rletic sohoole

believe that senae-peroeption is the organ ot knowledge and that
the thing. i_diatel,. known are the s8n.opy qualities or, a. the
are now more usuall,. oalled, .eose-4&ta."43

!be pr1Dla~ reason

why Dewe,. dentes immediate knowledge i. because it. aooeptance
would mean that th1. immediate knowledge vas alwa,.. tNe.

But he

has already admitted that noth1na ls so tpue that It may be exeupt
trom further Investigation.

Even tactual and conceptual objeots

whioh have proven true by providing solutions to problema may in
the tuture b. tal •• , 1t oond1t10ns ohanse.44

Hence, to acoept

42 "!he consldepations adduoed 1n discussion ot the
pattern ot Inquiry and ot the struoture ot ju~nt, entail the
conolus10n that all knowledge •• 8l'Ounded assert10n involves
.ediat10n. • •• !be pOSitIon here detended ruAa oounter to the
bel1ef that there 18 8uch a th1na as 1. .e41ate ¥novledge, and that
knowledge 18 an ind1spensable pre-oonditlon ot all medIated
knowledge." Dewe,., 1oa1o, 139.

-

4.3 Ibid.
44 "!.he fact that they have fulfIlled the demand.

~

posed upon them 1n previou. 1nquirie. i8 not a 10g1cal proof tnat,
1n the fo:rm. in which they have e.8rsed, the1£-ar8 orSans and
instrumentalities whioh vl11 satlsty the d.w~nds ot a new problematl0 .1 tua tlon." Ibid., 1 4 1 . ;

-

r;-------------,
anYthing except a.nae-data a8 immediately true would destroy the
progressive and esaentlally provisional character ot neweltl

trut~

Th1s approach to i_edi&t8 knowledge doe. not slmpl,.
••an that Dewel would be forced Into a regresaus
Let

~

inflnltum.

us recall again 1Ii1at Dewel sa,._ truth 1 ••
Suppo.e we st1ck to the notlon that truth is a 0 haraoter
that detine. an idea so tar
It 1_ tested througb the
actlon whloh carrle. to _uco •• sful completion Its own
intent. In thls cal., to make an Idea true 1.4~0 modit,
and transtorm It until 1t can stand thl. te.t. ~

a.

Each ide. i8 to be te.t8d tor Mnat 1t 1. worth.

Despite the tact

that Inquirl dependa on prev10us Idea., eacb new prooe.s ot
Inqu1r, 1s tested.
truth 1. there.

When a new problematlc .1tuatlon 1. solved,

lienee each Instanoe 1. partlcular and unique.

There ls no relJing on past concluslona strictl,.

So Dewe, i. not

foroed to an 1ntin1te resre •• , elther In tb. past or in tbe
tuture.

Where the Ichola.t1e pbilolopher would have 1mmedlate

knowledge, Dewe, place. hfPothetlcal material whICh directs inqnr
and act. as a gulde.

Th•• e h,pothe.e. disclo •• new material,

"mater1al which la l.'I.Ore relevant, more welghted and contIrl1lGd,
truittul, than were the in1tlal tacts and conceptiona whioh served
as the polnt ot departure. n 46 ObvioU8 In th18 phra •• 1_ the ettect

-

45 Dewey. Mind, 334.
46 Dewe, , Logl c , l43 •
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ot the tit.s·' in whioh
ti~ea

Dew.,. 11ved.

They "ere, a8 haa been 8a1d,

of ohange, t1mes at progress beyond old frontiers.

Thia

,o01010g1ca1 s1tuation 18 reduplIcated in Dewey'. conoept of
truth.
Such, then, ia the new alatem postulated bl n.we,. for
the attainment of knowledge.

Inqu1r7, whioh works in the indeter-

minate situation, whioh i8 progres8ive and cumulative, as well as
oontinuous, hazardoua, and provisional, is direoted by intel118eno

In the interaction ot organis. and environment, experienoe.

Hfpo-

tn.tical materlal and sen.. data, lnatead ot immediate knowledge,
direct8 inquiry and acts as a aulde.
truth, or settlement.

!ne rea.lt i. knowledge,

With thl. new .yst. . .atabli.hed, Dews,

ne.ded a new logic to oontor. to his method at obtaining truth,
for tne concept, judgment, and proposItion wl11 have thelr truth
only 1n so tar as they t1t witnin this new atructure.

Therefore,

we turn to a consideration of thia new logic in general, and in
particular, to a study ot truth in the element a compoa1ng the

new 10g1c.

4. mu'l'H

IN T.HE PROOESS OF INQUIRY

'l'he concept or 1de. tor Dewey 1s nt)t a atatl0 ea8ence.
Som.ehow or another the concept 1a 1 tsel.r ao

~
~J1lam1c

conceives ot it aa the operatIon ot thinking.
the worda of P. W. Bridgman, sa78, "In

gen.~al,

tba t Devey

Dewe7, in aooepting
we mean by anl

$3
concept nothtng more than a set ot operatiODaJ the concept is
.p10RPOUS

with the corresponding .et ot operations. "47

As an

operation or .et of operations the ide. will alv.l. be related to
action.

"Ide•• are not atatement. of what la or haa b.en, but ot

acta to be pertormed."48

In tact, sa18 Dewe"

"All conceptiona,

all Intellectual descriptions, muat be formulated in terms

operationa, actual or imaginatIve11 po.slble. n49
then an 1dea will be true in
profItable operations.

80

ot

Qulte olearlJ

tar as It Ieada to benetloial or

Hence the value or truth or idea. or

conoepta is judged by the outcome ot the operation Whlch in tact
i. aotuallJ the idea itselt.

Since conception.

and

1deas are

merel, deslgnations ot anJ operations Wh1ch are to be pertormed or
bave been pertormed, their truth is a derived truth, ona tlowing
trom the outcome ot the operation,

Because knowledge 18 not re-

pre.entational, truth will not be round in the oorre.pondenoe ot
Idea8 to realit,.

Idea. are true onll whan they produce satis-

taotor,- re.ults'.50

47

Considered abaolutel,. and 1n itaelt the Idea

P. W. Brldpan, The LotlC ot Modern.

York, Macmillan, 1927, S.
!2t Cartalntz, 111.

PhIlO.,

Dewerquo e. m:'lC!giian 1n

New

:::!. §!est

48 Dewel, SHest !2t Cartaintl' 138.
,-(
49 Ibid., 118.
'~

-"The,.

~~ :

SO
are sound it the operationa they direot glve
us tbe res~lts wnioh are requlred. • •• T.be busine.s ot thought
1s not to contora to or reproduoe the enaracters already pos.e •• e
by objects but to judge the• •s potentlallties ot what they beoome throusb an indioated operation." Ibid., 137.

-

~-----------.
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l ' next to nothing, ov bettev, it ia of no importance.

The tbeor1

of thought mevely reproduoing reallt1 1a aterile 8inoe the ooncept
l ' of value on11 when it 18 put into action, achieving certa1n
S'•• ulta.

With this atfirmation ot the fut1lity ot a knowledge
which 11 merely repre.entational Devey 1mplicitly denie. the
value ot ideaa ot objeot.
.ervation..

~loh

cannot be te.ted by empirical ob-

fbia non-empirical-oognltiv. experieno., whil. not

being impossible of achievement, borders on the us.l••• , but at
the .ame tim. it oan b. known bJ it. r.t.renoe to empirioal experi

enc., for Dew.., olaims that ph78ical objeots and th.Ir relation.
to
The

eaen

other are "instrumental to nOD-cosnitlve experI.nc •• nSl

qu •• tion itselt has no lnter •• t tor Dew.y .ince hi. concern i.

with the practical, with cognitive experience that provide.
answer. to problematic situation •• $2

AI DeweJ'a explanation advanoea from ide.a to judgments
to propositionl, he doee not la, much about the judgment. Poasibl
the reaaon for this il that he consid.r.d tho idea to be an

operation and hence not too distinct from the judgment. Or perhap
it il because Dewey consIders the

propo.ltlo~

to be nearer the

';"'1

end of knowl.dge, lilioh i. action of aome sc'rt.

51 Feldman, Philosophl 2!
$2

~

Dewel,

Feldman di.cu•••• thi. proble. in

Ea.entially, the

S8.
CI~pt.r

v.

r __--------------------------------------------------~
jUdgment 1s made trom related object..

"For we never experience

nor torm Judgments about objects and event. 1n iaolat10n, but

only 1n conneotion with a contextual whole.
18 oalled a

t

T.h18 latter 1. what

a1 tuation. t "53

In diatinguishing between the judgment and the propoaitIon, he .ay., "the content ot' the latter, 1s intermediate and
representative and 18 carr1ed by symbols; while judgment as
tlnally made haa d1rect exlstential Iaport."54 Since it has thi.
"exist.ential Import," 1t can be best explained by Dew87'. example

ot the word "Judgment" a8 u.ed 1n a law court, slnce a trial "1.
equivalent to the ocourrenoe ot a problematic situatlon whioh
requires settl. .ent."S5

Conflict about the signiticance ot what

bas taken place is .ettled b7 the JUQgment beoause "It decid••
exiatential condltions in their bearing upon further aotlvltle •• "
In other words, the judgment, 1n its tinal torm, 1. the settled
outoome of inquiry,S7

80

1t would not be rash to say that in the

ultimate judgment there 1. truth.

53 Dew.y. Lolic, 56.
54 Ibid. , 120.
5S Ibid.

56
57

ot inqulry."

-Ibid. , 121.
-

,

t·\

~,.

"t

"Judgment mail be identIt'ied as the •• ttled outcome
Ibld., 138.

-

S6
On the way to the tlnal s.ttlement, there are many partial settlement. or judgments.

Tbe.e prlor judgments reoelve

their truth only trom the value ot the tlnal judpent, WhIle at
,ame tlme the tlnal judgment depends on a ••rles ot partIal sett
ment •• S8

Theretore the truth ot any judgment wl11 con.lat In 1 ta

balng a tlnal •• ttlemant or a means toward that tlnal •• ttlement.
!h. reoording and atatement ot judgment. are propollt

They ar., .trlotlJ speaking, the mean. bJ which inqulrr prooeeds.
A. _ana, their tNth w11l be strlotly provl.1onal, dependent on

the outoome ot Inqulry.59

And .v.n In Ita tinally tormulated

te%"IU, though 1 t be the expreaslon ot what was a true judgment,
the propositlon must maintain ita provislonal truth .lnce It 1 •
••••ntlally a ..an., sharlng In the progre ••lve and oumulatlve
nature ot InqulPJ 1n general whiCh 11 Itaelf provillonal and aubjeot to the rert.lona ot tuture Inqulry.60

Revertlng to his

sa "Judgment as tinal .ettle.ent ls dependent upon a
.erle. ot partlal .ettlementa." Ibid., 122.
59

-

"Propo.ltlon. are the lnatrumenta by whIch provislonal oonolus10ns ot preparatory inquirle. are summed up,
reoorded and retaIned tor subsequent u •••• " Ib1d., 311.

-

"The 'truth' ot Any pre.ent l:~po.ltlon 1., by the
detIn1tion, aubJeot to the outoo.. ot oontiflued inqull"l •• , 1ts
t tNth, t it the word muat be uaed, is pl'Ov;lc_ional; as near '£Iii
truth as inqu1ry haa a. ,ei COM, a _ tteJl det.radned not by a
gue.s at lome tuture bel. but b7 the care and paln.a wrth whloh
Inqu1rJ haa b.en conduoted up to the pre.ent tl ••• " Deve7,
't£xperlenoe, Knowledge, and Value," S73. Italios 1n original.
60

$7
original defIn1tIon ot truth .a voyagIng, Dewey aa78 that .eally
t%'\1th

18 onl,. a neaztnes. to tNth.

For despIte the tact that a

judgment recorded in a prop08ition ma,. work today and tomorrow,
there ls no guarantee that it will work a week trom now.

Onl,.

when a person, In acoord wlth Dewe,.'. conoept ot the natur.,
purpose and source of Inqull'7, reall.es that the truth expttes.ed
In the proposltion 1. provi.ional, i. he really near the truth in
Dewey' •••n.e, that ls, "as near the truth as Inquir1 has 7et
oome."61
Dewey hesitated even to use the word "truth," because
evel'7one feels within hi.selt that the word "true" means permanent
ly true--true regardle.s ot ita us., regardlesa ot changing condItions and influenc.s.
was provisional.

Coneequently, Dewey emphaaized tbat truth

And einoe the individual ie In the prooe.s ot

approaohing truth, he must realize that when he oom.. oloa., the
truth ma7 ohange, or bette., oonditions m.1 Intervene whIch call
tor sometbing new.

Neverthele •• , the individual 1. still

61 Ibid. "Admiasion ot the necessary subjection of
every pr•• ent PiOPos1tioD to the results to b. obtained in fUture
inqulr:y 1s the meaning ot P.lroe'. reterenoe to toontes.ion ot i.naccuraoy and on•• idedne.a' aa an ingredient nf the trutb ot a
pre.ent propoaition. In other word., a per~)n who make. this adl111.alon 18 nearer the truth than an,. per.on~ho dogmatioally
olaims 1ntallhl1Ity tor tne conolualon he .nj.rt.1na nere and
DOW." Dewe,., "EXperienoe, Knowledge and Value," 573.
,

i I
I

I!:

:1

I
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approaching truth, and he may even find in that hazardous world
that he attains enough truth to control and shape hi. own environMent and surroundings.

But even when the proposition helps re-

~olve

a situation and become. endowed with validit"

the philoao-

~her,

like the soientist who welcomes the discovery or an exoeptiol

~ich

moditles a previous hypothesis, should weloome new develop·

~enta

in problematic situatioDa whlch mal modifl, or even

completely change previously valid ideas.
In this endle.s striving toward the ideal limit ot
inquiry, precisely what truth do propositions have as mean.?
Dewey answers the question.
The view most current at the pre.ent time i. probably
that which regard. proposition. as the unitary material
ot logical theory. PropOSitions upon this view have their
derining property in the property ot formal truth-talsity_
According to the position here ~aken, ~roposition8 are to
be difterentiated and identified on the ground ot the
function ot their contents a. means, prooedural and
material, turther distinctions 01 lorms ot propositions
being instituted on the ground ot the .pecial ways in whioh
their respeotive oharacteristic subject-matters function
as means. • • • But at this point it is pertinent to
note tbam, since means as suoh are neither true nor
tals8, truth-talsity is not a property ot propositions.
Means are either efteotive-or inettective; pertinent or
irrelevant; wastetul or econOmical, the criterion for
the dirference belng round in the consequences with
which they are conneoted as meane. On this basis
speoial propositions are valid (strong, erfective) or
invalid (weak, inadequate); loose or rigorous, etc. 63

63

Dewey, LogiC, 287.

.$9
commenting db th1s paasage, J. Oliver SUswell, Jr., obaepve.t
When Dewey 8ay. that propositlons are ne1tber true nor
talse but strong and ettective, or weak and inadequate,
lt must be remembered ~lat he has ruled out all a !riOri
criteria 01 whioh even to~se supposedly directlona
terms could be measured.b4
st111 Dewey doe. not absolutely deny tbat proposltions ma7 oe
true or false 1ntr1nslcally.

He aarnits ttlllt in pure thoorl it

may be innoouou. enough to oonsider proposition• •s true or
t81s •• 65 But a8 we have repeatedly noticed, Dew~l 18 not at all
concerned with pure theopy.

als mdnd was alw818 placing propo-

.1tions In the streamot activity.

Consequently, that a propo-

.it1on constitute truth "i8 the last view an empiricist oan
possibly take who 1. coneerned w1th truth and talSlty as having
existential applloat10n, and .s something determined by means ot
inquiry into material exlstence. R66

)(
I

s.

SUMMARY

In clarifying the general notion ot truth Dewa, baa
used equivalent terma, allot which oome to truth being the

64 J. Ollver SUawell, Jr., The Phllosofble. ot F. R.
Tennant and John DeweZ, New Iork, Phl10sopIllcaI ~6rar1;-riic.;
1t)50, li~ ~
t"

65 "For the teohnioal purpose. oil striotll tox-mal logio
an assumptIon that every propos 1 tiOD 1a ot 1't.elt, or intrins1oally, either true or talse mal not do hara." Dewey, "Experienoe,
Knowledge, and Value," 574.

66

Ibid.
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lueeesstul .ettlement ot a problem in a concrete situation.
naturall, must be verified to make it

~.ttlement

~.s.rtlble.
~lative,

wa~antably

But even the tinal resolution is progre•• ive and cu-

hence it must submit to the test ot ita suitab111ty in

ooncrete oircumatances.
~.t

~1.

Sinoe aOJ given truth 1s not f1nal, it

be provis1onal b1 nature.
~e

general means by which truth 1. found or reached

i. the proce.s ot inqu1ry which worka in an 1ndetermdnate s1tuation and whioh terminatea in reaching that which is settled.
Inquiry, like truth, 18 progressive and continuous and fraught
with hazard.

Reaaon, ut1liz1ng the proce •• of inquiry in actual

experience, is the dIrecting agent, and must work not with immediate knowledge but with an open mind toward the provisional nature
of all truth.

In th1a proce.s ot inquiry. ideas, the Judgment,

have only an abstraot truth in the... lve., but their conoret.
truth 1s entirely tunotional.

Henoe their existential or worth-

wh1le truth oon.ista precisely in·their ut1l1ty as means toward
reaohing •• ttled oonditione.
Thus tar
.ed.

~e

question,

~hat

i8 truth," has been diaeus-

A very 010ae11 connected and hardly distinguishable
question
,
~

"Bow 1s truth te.ted?" re•• ins to be

an8we~~.

In instrumenta118m

~

and pragmatism "the what" and "the how" are extremelJ
validity 1s really conferred by successful operation.

01080,

since

Still there

rr
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i

l' a distinotion; at very least, the same object may be con,idered under two difterent aspects,

truth as an ettect, the

oriterion ot truth as a cause and norm.

This olosely allied

question ot the criterion of truth must now ocoupy our attention.

CHAPTER IV

DEWEY'S CRITERION OP TRUTH AND ITS DETERMINING PAOTORS
In general, a
comparison.

c~lte~lon

is a standard ot m•• aurement or

In the pragmatlc tneor)" ot determ.1n1ng trlltb., the

.ettled 81tuatlon, the crlterlon, .1nce It ls Inevltabl)" partlall)"
1dentitied wlth the measured, mu8t necessarll)" be an aspect ot tbe
.ettled sltuation.

This settled sltuatlon or r.lolved problem is

the outcome ot InqulrJ, or what ha. be.n earller called tl'Uth.
The question then to be asked 11, How oan It be decided that a
problem has been solved?
wh1ch Dewey speaka?

Or, What 11 thl1 .ettled .1tuation ot

To answer these questlon. we .ust underltand

that once Dewey had rejeoted intelleotual oriteria, he set wt to
establish a philosoph)" nece.aar1ly difterent trom an)" ot the Intelleotual phllo.ophle..
outgrowth ot tour taotorl:
the rejection ot

~

Hl. oriterion ot truth was the 10gloal
the rejectlon ot 1ntellectual oriteria

prlori, principle., the postulation ot a new

hilolophy, the adherence to the theor)" ot aotion and reaotion ot
rganism whioh led

h~

to an instrumentallst theor)" ot knowledge.

1. to these .four taotora and thelr relat1<"n to Dewe)"'. criterI0
truth that we .hall turn our attentlon In

~

.'~he

tirst halt ot

Onoe these elements have been explalned, we shall
62

I
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.tudy the cause. or truth and falsity in general and the criterion

or

truth in the field of behaVior.
1.

DEltr&Y'S REJECTION OF' IllTELLECTUAL CRITERIA

Dewey prelude. his rejeotion ot intellectual criteria
with a .tudy of past times and consequent ob.ervations of the tremendous changes that have taken place over the centuries in every
f1eld.

Thus, when Dewey explains his rejection or Aristotle, whom

he identified as the most articulate and efricient exponent ot
intellectual criteria, he rirst gives the cond1tions of science an
oulture in Aristotle's day, and then he contrast. thOle conditions
with the science and culture of the twentieth century.
The competencJ' or traditio_l logic a. an organ ot inquirJ'
into exi.ting problema of oommon laDse and science is an
urgent question. This ohapter i., aooordingly. a critical
exposition of the main reatures ot the Aristotelian logiC
in reterence to (1) the conditions ot soience and culture
whIch provided its background and substantial material,
and (2) to their contrast with the oonditions of culture
and scienoe which now obtain. l
Dewey here gives an undeniable preeminenoe to the errect that
cultural and sooial conditIon. have on any philosophy_

This

theory is an attitude ot mind on Dewey's part rather than an inductive philosophical study_

Bence, his main occupation in the

chapter above mentioned il simply to

emphas~.e
v.

the obvious taot

that social condi tiona of the present are noit the same as they

rr~--------~ I,

I

:i!\i
,,I,

were oenturi'8 ago.

The~erore,

he ooncludes that the philo8ophy

or

ot the past, and 8pecirioally, the criterion
tit the needs

or

truth, will not

A

\I~
:,i
f~

the present day because truth is basically the

solution to a praotical problem.

As the problem changes in ad-

!/

·1'

1II1

vancing civilization, truth must change also. And since the ractor
determining truth is the oonsequences whioh ensue, different oonsequences are now demandedJ hence the need of a new criterion.
Despite the tact that a new oriterion is needed, Dewey
would never go so tar as entirely to rejeot an Aristotelian logic
which he considered to be both a suitable and accurate expression
of rules tor logic.
The Aristotelian logic as tar as its spirit, instead ot
its letter, i8 concerned, is nevertheless both generically
and specitioally signitioant tor what needs to be done in
logic in the oontemporary situation. Generically, the
need ls for 10g10 to do tor pre.ent .oience and culture
what Aristotle did ror the scienoe and culture or hls
tlme. 2
There is no question here ot an aosolute and permanent truth in
Aristotelian logic as such, but rather a utility and signiticance
deriving rrom Its adjquacy in a past dayproach should be kept.

The Aristotelian ap-

But since Aristotle's philosophy, like all

philosophies, arose rrom a certain social milIeu, Its literal
utility vanished with the demise
wh1ch 1t was begotten.

2

or

the anci~nt civilizatiGn trom

,t

Aristote11an1sm, oncv beyond reproach

newey, Logic,

95.

!I

'~,!i

"
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~ts

because at

pertect suitability to ancient Greek civilization,3

was not so much rejected by Dewey as necesaarily eliminated by
civilization's growth.
To detend the elimination at Aristotelianism, Dewey had
to prove that conditions ot culture and science now are completely
different trom what they were in Aristotle!s day.

Dewey, however,

satistied himself with merely pointing out that among the Greekl
"medicine, mulic and astronomy. meteorology. language, and political institutions were all studied with the means at command in
ways treer tram external control than was the case in any previous
civiliaation."4

At that time man was not lome thing apart, but

rather related to nature.
tor the Greeks.

Hence nature was the tinal

considerat1o~

In nature as such, there was a two-told division:

physical nature, that which underwent change; and nature or
essence ot individual entities. the unchanging Bubstance with
fixed characteristics.

Theretore, the problem at the Greeks

3 ~t would be completely erroneous to regard the toregoing as a criticism ot the Aristotelian logic in its original
formulation in connection with Greek culture. As a historic document it deservel the admiration it has received. As a oomprehenslve, penetrating and thoroughgoing intelleotual transcript ot
discourse in isolation from the operations i~ which discourse
Eakes erreet, It Is above need tor praise. ~mat has been said is
a criticilm ot the ett'ort to maintain that ],\lgic with revisions
here and there, as ad.Q.~ate or even releva_t'to the science 'ot
today." Ibid., 93-94. Italics in original.

-4

-Ibid.,

82-83.
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binged on the distinction of' the permanent and the ohangeable.
Aristotelian logic, therefore, employed the forms ot known existence which were determined "by the basic division supposed to
exist In Nature between the changing and

the~ernal • • • •

The

various grades of intellectual appr.hension corresponded, with
their logical forms, polnt tor point with the graded ranklng of
subjects in thelr qualitative degrees ot Be1ng.">
Since change lacks measure, says DeWe1,O and mark. the
presenoe ot the ind.finite, It could not be knoWD except In so far
as it was .nolos.d.
by the Gre.ks.

The .yllogi.m was the torm of .nclosure used

Following OR the distinction of the permanent and

the changeable, on. type ot syllogism .xpr•••• d the n.oessary,
the other contingent knowledge.7
change, the specle. i8 eternal.

But .inc. only particular beings
Aristotl. held' that, "that which

belongs inherently and nece.sarily to a specles i. its nature or
essenc •• ftS At the apex ot these species and natures i. man who

5 Ibid., 84.
6

-Ib1d.

-"That which Is fixed and permanent by nature excludes

7
ev.ry other substance by its very nature ••
Thus in addition
to the fundamental logical torm ot uni versa~,' (complet. beoause
dealing wlth what 1s whole by nature) and n.~.ssary propOSitions
and relation. ot propositions, there are po.'1tive and negative
propo.itions corresponding to ontological inclusions and excluslons." Ibid., 85. par.nth•••• and ita11cs 1n original.

I. .

-8

!lli., 86.
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"retains botn vegetative and animal functions:
tite, and locomotion."9

sensation, appe-

And above all in the Greek system was

God, pure and self-moving activity.

Such was the broad outline

of Greek philosophy as Dewey saw it.
Dewey's conolusions about Aristotelian philosophy
are three-told:

first, torms ot knowledge are torma of subjects

actualized in knowledge; secondly, "knowledge, in its logical
forms consists exclusively ot detinition and olassitioation;"lO
thirdly, "there is no room for any logic ot discovery and inven.
tion.

Discovery was thought ot under the head of genuine

learning, and learning was then merely coming into possession ot
that already known • • • • "11

Sinoe Dewey thought that tor Aris-

totle learning merely connected two previously given forms of
knowledge, such a theory would in no way advance or solve the
current problema.

Add to this faot Dewey's beliet that modern

"science destroyed the baokground of essence and species upon
which the original logiC was based,n1 2 and you see why Dewey
naturally felt thoroughly justified in repudiating Aristotelianis
and with it, sinoe he considered Aristotellanism the prototype

9

Ibid.,
...........

10

Ibid.
............

11

Ibid •
...........

12

Ibid.,
............

87.

88.

~

~

~
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ot intelleotual philosophies, any other striotly intelleotual
philosophy, be it that ot the Greeks, the scholastics, or the
moderns.13
The necessary oonclusion ot this rejeotion is the elimination ot intelleotual oriteria.

Dewey oannot and will not

allow his oriterion ot truth to proceed from the antecedent nature
of things or trom an untested oorrespondenoe ot the mind to reality-

His conoern can be with the praotioal order only.

is no

~

It there

priori nor absolute truth based upon the known natures of

things, Dewey is quite naturally and pleasantly, according to his
predisposition ot mind and temperament, forced to choose CODsequenee. as his oriterion ot truth.

Since a truth ot natures aa

such is valueless tor him, operational truth, with consequences
as a determinant, Is of paramount Importance.

2.

EXPLICIT REJECTION OF !

_PH_I_O~H~I

PRINCIPLES

Clearly Implicit In Deweyfs reasofts tor rejecting
Aristotelian 10glc and intelleotual philosophy is the rejectlon ot
any! priori truth whioh might possibly be a criterion ot truth.
In his earlier periods Dewey had wavered between complete rejection
13 "!he change in the oonoeption or Nature is expressed
in summary torm in the idea that the universe is now conceived as
open and in process while Classloal Greek thought ot it as finite
In the sense In which finite means tlnlshed, complete and pertect."
Ibld., 93.

I,
i'
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ot ! priori lnd absolute truth and qualified aoceptanoe.

He had

contessed that there might be some things which would always be
true.

But he goes right on to say%
We must not exaggerate the permanence and stabi11ty ot
such truths with respect to thelr recurring and prospeotive
use. It 1s only relatively speaking that they are unchanging. When applied to new oases, as resources tor copIng
with new dlttlppltl.s, the oldest of truths are to some
extent remade •.L4

What was consldered as an ! priori principle in the past, and
whlch might be grudgingly called true, even by Dewey, must meet
the same test as aDJ other warranted assertion:
valid oonsequences.

II

~

It must have

Hence, Dowey was tacing back with one hand

what he seemed to be giving with the other.

Like hi. rejectlon

ot intellectualist phIlosophy In general, the partlcular attack
on ! irlori truth was based on soienoe, for men must at all time.
take on "the attltude ot the soientitic inqulrer. n1 $

And this

attitude expressed ltselt by acoepting ideas as hypotheses untIl
conflrmed by consequences.

Even a moral truth, if it i. not "re-

oreated to the urgencies ot t~e passing hour,"16 is false.

How-

ever, when those ideas are tested, they "get a generalized energy
of posltlon.n17

Hence, even at this early period of Dewey'S

-

14 Dewoy, Mind,
1$
16
17

-Ibid.
Ibid.

-Ibid. ,
-

,34.1.

)4,2.

';

(

'~1l'

'I':;1
'
:1

I

Iii

;,II!
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philosophy, the truth came from the instrumentalism ot the idea,
ao t trom the constitution of reality and the oorrespondence ot
the mind to that reality.

It was Dewey 1 s firm belief that "to

a,cribe values Whioh are due to an instrumental and aelthetic
character to some interior and

~

priori constitution of truth is

to make fetishes of· them. n18
Later on, ot oourse, Dewey became explicit and definite
1. affirming that there were neither ultimate nor! priori truths

ot any sort.

Any metaphysics that conoerned itselt with fixed

truths was bound to be barren.

The essenoe ot the pragmatism he

preferred 1s that the mind be not subjeot to any foregone conclusions.

Since the pragmatist believes that he can re-make the

world, he does not want to submit to things that are ineVitably
true,19 tor the fUnction ot the intellect is to change external
reality and be changed itselt in tne procedure; consequently there
can be no room for a permanent or an ! priori truth which might
lerve as a criterion ot all truth. 20

18

Ibid.,
............

)42 •

19 "In the perspectives ot this philosophy (pragmatism)
there are no last te~, no tinalities, no ~\timaoie8. In 80 far
.s metaphysics is a reasoned envisage.ent o4.!tinalities and ultimaCies, always and everyone the same, pragm\tism is a philosophy
without a metaphysic." Kallen, "John Dewey (md the Spirit ot
Pragmatism," 40.
20 "Reason is now a patterned activity whioh alter.
What it works on and alters in its own being as it works, bringing

rr
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I

3.

mE MATURE OF PHILOSOPHY

Once Dewey had made a definite rejeotion of all intellectual and

~

priori oriteria, he was faoed with the necessity ot

explaining the origin, the nature and funotion of philosophy,
first of all to justify hi. own rejeotion ot past philosophy, and
seoondly, to eatabliah his system.

As in his study of intelleo-

tualism, whioh was typified for him in Aristotle, he had approached the study in the light of history, so here, too, his approach
was historioal and somewhat psychologioal.

ae started with man

who lives in a "world of signs and symbols."2l

Man, however,

differs trom the beast in his remembrance and preservation of
past experienoes, for he reoalls the past, especially 1n so far
as it add. something to the present.

Early man, says Dewey,

lived in a world of reco1leotions of emotional interest to himself.

In thi. natural and somewhat primitive state man does not

study the past scientifioally, but rather in a8 much as it conceAW
him.

Oonsequent1y, ancient man lived in a world of fears and

hopes, "made of imaginations and suggestions, not significant of
t
t·

into existenoe not foregone oonolusions but ;~nd8 different from
their beginnings. Reason is the art of guid':1tlg chance by choice,
and surmounting fatality by judgment. • • • Rea80n is thus
reoognized as oreative intel1igenoe." Ibid.
21

Dewey, Reoonstruotion, 1.
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s world of objective tact intellectually contronted."22 This was
a primal state of stories and legends without any appreciable
significance.

Soon, however, th1a original material ot stories

and legends was consolidated, and experiences which pertain to
the majority ot men were "sooially generalized, «23 aince they
concerned the oommunity.
blrth to tradition.

T.h1s generalization of experienoe gave

At the same time individual retlections

began to tocus on the community

8.

a aoclal unit.

T.hen oame the

formation ot a government, and the beliet. of the group,

to~erly

amorphou., were systematised to obtain aoclal unlty.
Whether thia is literally 80 or not, it is not necessary
to inquire, much le8s to demonstrate. It il enough tor
our purposes that under 80cial influenoes there took place
a fixing and organising ot dootrines and cults wnioh
gave general traits to the imagination and general rules
to conduct, and that such a consolidation was a necessary
antecedent to th"to~atlon ot any philosophy a8 we understand that term.~
This consolidation was and i8 at one and the same time a basis
and a result of the formation ot any philosophy in any
tion.

civiliza~

Consequently, the particular pertinenoe ot the philosophy

is woven from the social fabrio, both

22

Ibid.,

its cause and effect.

7.

IbId., 8.
23 ...........
~

8S

Ibid., 9.
............

':1

cO'I'
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Bowever, given this general organization, Dewey claimal
There is still lacking the motive for logical system and
intellectual proot. This we may suppose to be turnished
by the need ot reconcillng the moral rules and Ide.ls embedded In the traditional code wlth the matter of taot
positivistic knowledge which gradually grows up.2$
The signlficance of such a concept of the origin ot
philosophy needs no more articulation, except, perhaps, a reminder that such a notion was fundamental to newey.

Dewey lectured

on this subject, and in the first chapter ot Reconstruction

~

philosophy, summarized his theory_
It this lecture succeeds in leaving in your minds as a
reasonable hypothesis the idea that philosophy originated
not out ot intellectual material, but out ot sooial and
emotional material, it will also succeed in leaving with
you a Changed attitude toward traditional philosophies.a)
~s

has been clearly implied in the earlier section ot this chapter,

the general criterion ot philosophy and its truth or value will
be the success it has in solving practical problems. 27
Since philosophy will bave no abstract meaning whatsoever, it cannot oonsider truth as suob, nor being, nor the

Ibid.,
25 ...........

26

9-10 •
,

Ibid., 25.
...........

~

~

27 "Instead ot the disputes ot ri:~als about the nature
ot reality, we have the soene ot human claan ot soclal purposes
and aspirations. Instead ot impossible attempts to transcend ex~erience, we have the signitioant record ot tne eftorts ot men to
tormulate the things ot experience to whioh they are mOlt deeply
and passionately attaOhed." Ibid •

..........
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absolute.

It~ill

not disengage itselt tram singular and particu-

lar conditions by abstraction, but in tact will mainly concern
t.el with the singular and particular.

Hence, philosophy will

aeal primarily with what Dewey calls "meaning" in singular and
particular situations.

Dewey employs this term "meaning" to re-

place but not to eliminate truth as the object ot philosophy_
~im,

For

meaning ia a broader term involving truth plua tne ettecta

an object has on a situation when the object i. put into uae.
'.thi. meaning will at one and the aame time be the end of inquiry
~nd

the criterion ot truth.

~hiloaophy

Since Dewey conceivea the function of

to be precisely the achievement of aignificant meaning,

pe goes to 80me length to explain a 80mewhat atmospheriC term.
Meaning i8 wider in scope aa well as more precioua in
value than is truth, and philosophy is occupied with
meaning rather than truth. Making such a statement ia
dangerous; it ia easily misoonceived to signify that
truth ia of no great importanoe under any circ~tancesJ
While the tact i8 that truth i8 80 infinitely important
when 1t ia important at all, namely 1n records ot eventa
and de.criptions ot existence., that we extend it. claims
to regions where it has no jurisdiction. But even as
reapecta truths, meaning is the wider category; truths are
but one claas ot meanings, namely, those in which a
claim to ver1ticability by their eonsequenees ia an
intrinsic part ot their meaning. Beyond thia ialand ot
meanings which in their own nature are true and talae
lies the ocean ot meaninga to which truth and talsi ty
are irrelevant. 28
r

There seem to be two threads ot thought here t

:~

One is that there

are 80me object. which are true 1n their natu'.re, hence tree trom

28 Dewey, PhIlosophy

~

Civi11zation,

4-5.
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the criterion of utllity or meaning.
the truth of such objects would be

But Dewey would add that
useless sinoe, like abstract

propositlons and judgments, they have no vital effect on the
soclal situation.

Hence, if they are to have any truth, it will

be the truth they might have as means, in which case a better
term would be suitability.

Secondly, Dewey seems to pOint out a

second class of objeots in whioh truth and ralaity would have
no pOint.

Now this could mean that the consequences alone are

important, and these would be called valid, not true.

Or it could

also mean that the relation to consequenoes on the part of these
objeots is not a neoessary one.

In other words, this olass or

objects would have a relation to consequences only when they had
been put into action, not betore.

An example ot the second t7pe

would be all practioal judgments that have nothing to do with
behavior as suoh, as, for example, the statement that John Brown
is the author of a oertain book.

The first type of objeot would

be judgments that tall under the category ot moral retlection.
Despite the lack ot olaritl in the passage, one thing stands out:
in either type ot object the important factor i8 the consequence.
Whether it be intrinsic or extrinsic to the meaning, the point is
that the determining taotor for all truth

the consequence in

i~
~

aotion.

And it is precisely with the oon8eJ~ence that the new
;"

philosophy postulated by Dewey must constantly and primarily
deal.
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It~i8 important to note that what has been said above
~as

oome from statements Dewey made about the history of philo80Phy.

He has pointed out that philosophy originates in sooial problems,
has the function of solving these problelns, and grows by its adaptation to changes in oivilization.

Therefore, this conception of

philosophy in its growth and funotion, coupled with his rejeotion

ot intellectual oriteria, postulates a pragmatic criterion.
bis philosophy is concerned with consequences

~ich

For

will serve at

one and the same time as its end and its criterion.

4.

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE ORI TEHION OF TRUTH

Having proceeded thus far in a negative manner, Dewey'S
tirst step in a positive direction is the establishment ot hie
own schema in

~

guest

knowledge will proceed.

~

Oertaintz from

~ich

his theory ot

Dewey's concept ot the complete function

ot knowledge is enlightening.

He begins with the thought that,

"the eniet oonsideration 1n achieving concrete security of value
liea 1n the pertecting of methods ot action."29

Such a theory

takea exception to the beliet that before operat1on we can know
what knowledge must be and then use our concept of the nature of
knowledge to judge oonolusions in the

abstr~;~t.
~"

In reference to

such an ! Eriori assumption as opposed to h{~ theory drawn from

29

Dewey, guest tor Oertaintl, 31.
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the sociologloal situation, Dewey aays:
The theory 1n question makea JlO such aS8UIJlp\ion. It
a.sert. that by aoa. operatioJla concluaio.s e••rae in
which objecta onoe unoertain and confused are rendered
clear aftd stable. Alter name. as much a. you pleas.,
reruse to call one .et ot consequenoes knowledge and
another error, or rev ••• e appellationa, and theae conaequence. remain just what the, are. T.hey pre.ent the
difference between resolved and claritied situationa
and disordered and obscure ones.30

pewey, in his ua. ot the terma, "uncertain and contuaed," "clear
and stable," ie saying the same thing as the theory he denies,
with thls exception:

the theor, he attacks holda that oonclusions

oan be uncertain aad contu.ed berore tbel are put into operation
it, tor example, there has been a detect ia the reasoning proceas.
Devey, however, holds that the criterion determining certainty 1.
trial.

Theretore,

haa no me.aing.
l'loth11l1.
tioDa.

DeweY'a theory standa, knowledge in it.elt

a8

Internally, isolated, 1n it. ow.

natu~e

it 1a

Inqu117 and knowledge haYe valld1 ty onl,. wi thin 81 wa-

7,bere oan be no ditterentiation .mong the

prece •• ot lraqulry_
happ••• 1f there be

Oae critio,
110

how&ve~,

p.~t.

ia the

state. very well what

d1trerent1atioll 1n the entire proce •••

1ft order to Pecogn1&& problema and values within aDJ
va~lou. part. ot the prooel. must
be ditterentiated, otherwi.e the direotional meaniD8
or the tar_, "proble." aDd "valu.•• W liGula at 'appear .31

&1 ve. proo ••• , the

r,/~
:~
a,>

:~,

)0
~

-

Ibid., 219.

31 suawell, Jr., Phlloaophlef;.
Dewel, 387.
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Dewey seeks to give directIon to nature not bl differentiating
the parts but rather through the efforts ot the intelligent agent
wbo acts through the prooes8 or inqu1ry to change existence In
80_

wa7.

lIbell the problem.atic s1tuatlo11 ari.es, the process ot

inquIry starts.

Oonstructive and re-tormative thought then be-

comes part or existenoe.
Conaequently reason, or thought, 1. its more general sense,
haa a real, tnough l1mited, tunction, a creatIve, constructive tunetioll. It.e torm general 1deas and it we
put the. 1. action, consequences are produced whloh
could not be produced otherwl.e. Under these condition.
the world Will be difterent trom What It would have bee.
It thought had aot Intervened. 32
At tnis point an indIvidual study ot each element
w1thia the process oE inquiry will help clarity just what Dewey
.ean. wbe. he establishes consequences as the orIter1on
When

a.

Dewe7 say. It 1.

or

truth.

1dea has a part 1. the reshapIng cf envlroament,
t~e.

"tcr 1t i8

p~eci.e17

the oapacity or the

ide. as an aim and method of action to deterMine this transtorma-

tIc. which 1. the criterion ot ita truth."3)

projected tor

80• •

purpose.

!he idea i8 always

When the idea actual11 operates 1t

beco.e. tl"U••
t

~;i
~i'

32 :o.we1, Pb110.oeel !!! 01vIl1Zi\10ft.
33

-

Dewe7, Mind, 338.

19

The

jUdgment too mu.t Ineat this same criterion.

mentl institute definite existential situations.

Judg-

Normally, be-

tore a final settlement 1s reaohed, many partial .ettlements have
taken place upon whioh a final judglllent is dependent.

Allot

these judgments preceding the tinal Judgment have the lame criterion.

"The consequenoes the: produce in the conduct of' fUrther

inquiry i8 the oriterion of their value."34

f.ne tinal judgment

i8 som.ething crucial and cri tical for it is about an individual

situation under special oonditions at a given time.

It 1a thil

judgment, involviag other temporal Judpant., wh10h live. a determinate resolution and ramificatIon to the problematIc aituation.35

Since the objective consequence is valid, the Judgment

1s true.
According to Dewey, in both common sen.e iaqulry and 1.
strict .o1efttltle inquiry there is what miSht be

pro 01 ty ot cr1 teriol'l.

te~ed

a reei-

Both t,-p •• ot inqui17 utilIze tacta and

ide.. which ar. the ppoduct. ot preVious i.quip1...

Seient1t!e

1l1qui17

dlffers trom conaoa .ense in the scrupuloua car. taken
to en.ure both that the earlier codblua1ons are fitted

34

Dewe 7,Logic,

122.

35 Ibid., 134. Temporal here means that tna subjectmatter or the judgment uadergoes constant reconstitution in the
prooess ot jUdgment.
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1. advoce to be ...ana fop regulation of 1ate1' laqulrle"
aad the care tak•• to ."Ul'e that apeclal r •• t. aDd OOB.e,tl0.' ...pl0784 1. the,late.. one. 1.1'. 't1'lot17 relevaa'
to the problem 1n hand.)
Oommoa .enae proo.ed. 1• • aore •• aual mama.er.
iaquiry •• t. out to 41.oovel' the ba.l.
attltude. to opol'at. caulally_
way tor latol' judgment..

~ich

But eaoh t7J)e

or

e.tltle. habit' and

Eal'llor eonclual0.a pl'eparo the

A .ublequ••' ju«sme.t

~ch

ope1'8to.

effeotivoly would bave a' It. orltol'lon ,1'ior judsae.ta ot the
.... BAtupe aR4 partial •• ttl..ent. upon whioh the tinal judgaent
i. ba•• d.

U eon ••que.ce. prove that pnol' judpe.t. were i.ef-

tectual, the Itrlot and tormal oriterion would be the oO.loque.co,
whioh tol1ow the flul judPAUlt.
!he ju4sment, Dewe,

,1.",

u.o. tho ,e.e1'al whioh 1,

"ooa.eptual or Ideatlonal 1. aaturo."37 Bowe.e., the OOD••,ta
18vol.e4 do aot r.p.....t materlal n\hat 1. fouad to be aateo.d. . .
17

'.0.... '

to • auaber of alasulara."38 ~v.7 ooacelve. the

.e.e •• lt, ot the oOB.ept a. bel.. aulselted by but ROt derlved

tl'O_ 11ngular..

"1h1.

oo.o.ptual cll. . . .101l 1., tuJtthe,..,re, held

to b. 10,101.117 aa objeotlve aeoea.ary ooaditl08 18 all detemi• •

36

Ibid.,
,

37

-Ibid.
-Ib1d •

)8

.39

246.

Ibld. , 263.

-
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URi tel the varioul pO.llbl1itie. ot operatl0..
,till

DO

Bere there 11

que.tloR ot valldit1 or warranted a •••rtIbl11ty.

It 1.

oa11 when thl. tinal Judgment operat•• that the qu.stlon ot truth
eater..

The tlaal value of Ideas and judgments come. aot from

iater.al oon.l.te.c1, but from con.eque.c •••
Bypoth•••• are condltlonal. !beT have to be tested
by the consequenc •• of the operatlon. the1 define aad
direct. • • • But thelr fInal value 11 not determ1.ed
b1 their Inter..l elaboratloD aad 00•• 1Ite.o1, but by
the con.equences thel ettfot In existenoe a. that 1.
p.rceptlbll experleaoed.40
P~opo.ltlon.

for Dewey are 11kewl•• Instrumental.

are the meana of overt activlty 1. the proc ••• ot inqulry.

!hel
"Pro-

poaltl0.1 al suoh are, cO.I.que.tly, provllio.. l, intermediate
and Inatrua.ntal."41

neweJ divld•• propo.itlon. Into two tJP •• t

the materlal, wnlch la "exll'entlal, reterring dlrectly to actual
00Rdltl0•• al det.Pad.ed bJ experl.e.tal oblervatl0.,~ aad the
procedural,

"~lOh

are ROB-exlste.tlal 1. oOBte.t In direot re-

tere.ce but which are applloable to exlltenoe through the
operatio.1 they repr•• e.t

.1

pOI.lbll1tle•• "43

T.be very nature

of the propo8itloa 1. cO.8tltuted 1;)1 operatloa. tor th.e

40 Dewe., I 9!e.t !!!: OertalntI'
41

Dewe,. t Loli 0, 28) •

-

42 Ibld.
43 Ibid.,

283-~.

16~~.

:v
'

Italic. 1n ol'l,l.al.
Iii'
!''i'I,''I'
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propositIon !n itaelt i8 a symbolizatIon and i8 not complete and
tiDal.

Since inquiry "i8 concerned with objeotive transrormation.

ot objeotlve subject-matter,"44 the proposition has the aame end.
propositions are ftproduct. ot provislonal appraisal., evaluatloJ'lS,

ot existences and ot conceptlons aa means ot In.tltutlOIl or .flnal
judgment which 18 objectlve re.olutlon of a problematic situation. "45

F:Pom the repeated use ot the word "provisional," it 1.

olear that Dewey alwa1s conceives propositlons strictly aa .e&!l.,
beaoe he doe. Dot us. the description "true" Whe. apeaklag ot
propoaitiol\8.46
III .ummar)" I then, we

s.. Dew.,.,

tal ooherence alo•• could give us
an

hJ.PO'bhe.~~.

~th,

doe8 not adm1 t tba t uJ!but 1t could sive oal,

A theory oal, pretends to correspond to reallt7
r'

."..

(j~

t",1lc:\

·"1"}~

l:;~"

.<.;-"*'"

Ulltl1 1 t haa beea put 1nto...-'.-'...
acts.on.
/)flr." In act!.. upon this
...•
J•.•..•.
notloR, w. are 'brought to the tact whIch 1t implies or which lt
demands, then this notlon ls tru •• ~~

44

287.
-Ibid.,
"But at this pOint it i. pertinent to note

45
that,
81noe mean8 as such are .elther true ftor tal •• , truth-talaity 1.
ot a prope,..t,. ot prop08it101'18. Mean8 a,... elther .ttectlv. or
nettective; pertinent or irrelevaat; wa.te~l or ecoRomical, the
erl terlon tor the dirterence beiJlS tound 111~,he conaequenoes Wi th
ich the,. are connected .s meaas." Ibld.9

46
47

I'bld.
-Dewe"

Phllosophl

~

OivI1IsatIon, 24.
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It tollowa that reaSOD has a ooastruotive fUnotion.
wnen we

ro~

general Ideas and put them Into actloR, new conse-

quences tollow .0 that the world i. dirter.nt trom wnat it was before.

In the instrumentallst theory thought tunctio•• "1n the

experi••• tal determinations ot tutu~ oon ••queaoes."48

a••ee, the

validit, ot these prInciples derIved trom experimental operation
1s determined by "the coherenoe ot the ocn••quencel produoed by
the habits they artlculate."49
Onoe alalD the distinction between the criterion ot
truth and truth Itself must be called to miAd.

We are here oon-

ceraed with two aspects ot What really seem to be one and the aame
thina:

oonsequences 1n the order ot operatio. both eonstitutlag

and determinlng truth.
the,. are o.e

thln~u

In

80

tar

a8

consequences oonstitute trutb

1n so tar as the)' are a measure according to

which truth is judged, the,. are another thing--not .eparable, it!e
true, but dIstinct .s aspects.

5.

DETERMINING OAUSES OF TRUTH AND PALSITY IN GENERAL

Give. a reJeotlon ot intellectual criteria and the conceptloll ot philosoph1 and1alowledge

a8 esse~tIalll
I,;

-Dewel, toilo, 13.

48 Ibid., 26.

49

functional

'"

1n concrete surroundings, that whioh will determine truth aad
falsity will in general haye to be something i . the realm of

cessrul operation.

8UO-

It the outcome ot 1nqulrl tepaiaatea 1. an

empirically be.etioial c0801uaion, truth haa b.en reached.

But

it an Inept meana has b.en used to reach the desired ••d, thia

diacrepaac1 betw.en means aad .·ad will cau.ae errol".
There alway. exiata a disorepanoy between means that are
employed and cons.que.o •• that 8.8ue# aometime. this di8Ol-epancy i8
.ertous that the result ls what we call
mistake
error.50

._d .0

The dlscrepanoy referred to 1a the taot that "the co_ceptlons employe. 1. deliberate InqulrJ, must be prea ••t &ad aotual, whtl.

cORaequencea to be attained are ~ture."5l
remain.:

SUt the queation atl11

what preels.17 deterlliae. whe. aouthi •• 18 tal •• , whe_

there 1. a atate ot .rror?

Gra_ted that the oaus. will be a lack

ot propel- ua. ot lIleau 01- laauftlele.t aad lacorreot means, the
queatioa stlll to be determin.d 1. wnat crit.rioa judge. whether
truth or tal.1tl ia preseat.

Manr or1tIcs of Dewer ma1ntaln that newe7 .a,a that 1t
a thiag work., it 1.
taot1oa, 1t 18 true.

aenae.

t~ue.

Othera aa7 that 1t 1t otter. aatla-

Both ot the.e atatements are correct 1n a

But Dewel demi •• that b1

aati8tactl4~
1":-

:"

~l'

-Ibid.

50 IbId., 39.
$1

-

he mea.a a theorr ot

r--------------.
85
merely personal satlstaction.$2 The satistaotion Dewey speaks ot
18 the satisfy1ng of objective condit1ons, in other words solving

the problematic-situatlon.

William Savery explains well that

actual workabilIty is the criterion tor all propositions.
Accordi.a to my proposed geaeralizations true propOSitions
would be classitied aa tollows: (1) thOle that are ~erl
tied, (2) those that will be veritled, (3) those~at
CAB be (ph1sically) vir1'?ii<r, (4) those that might !!!.
rrogfOally) verltied.S3
This verifieaticD means that the proposition does solve a problematic-situation.

A. long, the., as there 1s aotual or possible

verifloat1on ot agreement between meaning and tact, truth is present.
IncompatIbIlIty ot two conceptions can only be discovered
by theIr confrontatlon. H.n.e verIfication &ad oohereace
may be united In a contlueDt theory- In empirIcal truth
there 1s all act"YJll or pos.ible apeement betwee. mea.ina
and tact • • • • 54
Therefore, it would •••• correot to 8ay that satiaraot10., pro perl,
understood, that i8, tulf1ll1ag the object1ve condition. neoeasary

tor auoc•••tul operatloa, or workabIlity, determine the validlty
ot propositiona and l.ad to wapra.ted assertioD.

H.lp1ag 1n tn.

process ot inquiry 18 a tURotloft which all propositions, judgmenta
and 1deaa must tultill before the,. may be true or tal.e.

Dewey

~(

52 newe" "Exp.rienoe, Kaowl.dge'~nd Value," 572.
53 1..11l1am saver." "Sipl!'ic..c. ot Dewey' 8 Phl1osoph,....•
The PhilOS02h~ of Joh~ 0.
.d. Paul A. schliPPt Evans tOft,
lortfiwe.tern nrvei'in'y,
9, 506. Italics 1a original.

19;'

54

~.,

S07.
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provide.

aa~.xample

whiGh claritl.8 the tn.ory.

Th. 8yllogi •• "All .a,.lllt•• ar. mad. ot pt.e. oh•••• '

the mooa 18 a .at.111t., tb.r.tor., 1t 18 .ade of sr •••
ob•••• " i8 tormally oorraot. !he propo.ltl0•• lavolyed
ar., hovever, Invalld, not jUlt beeau •• th.y are "mat••
rlal17 tal.e," but becau •• iast.ad ot promotiag laqulr.%
they would, It take. aad u ••d, r.tard and mialead 1t.'5

7.

CBI'fBftIOll 0' !RUTH AWl> BEHAVIOR

It 1. qulte olear trom what hal hltherto be.a .aid that
conl.~.nO.8

will d.t.rai.e the truth ot behavior ju.t a. it de.

term1ae. the truth ot kaOwledg.... d the truth ot eaoh part ot
prooe •• ot inquiry.

t~

But alao. Dewey was -.1•••tly conoern.d with

the practioal aad the 8001al, hl. criterioD ot truth hal partloular 81saltlo..o. 1. th. t1eld ot bebavior.

JU8t .xaotly what bi8

orlt.Pioa ot behavior 1081oa1l7 18, 1. well .xplal••4 by Wiltrid
S.llar. i. aa iroale eo.oluaion to hi. e.8ay, "LaasuaSe, Rul•• aad
B.baylor."
The .kel.toDS ot rul •• oaa b. sive. a pragmatio or i.ltl'll...talilt Ju.titloatlon. fbi. jUltitioatloa operat ••
wlthia a •• t ot l1viDI rul... the d.ath ot oa. rule i.
the lit. ot aaother. BYe.. ..a a.d th. • . .41 rule _,. be
both ltviD. a. Ju.titiea•• aad dead a. iu.tltleaadwM,
whe. wa juatl,t,. a rule ot 10glc. I.d•• , oa. the ait.apt
to jUltlt,. pul•• fro. le,tt to rlght, b. "7thlq but u.
exhibitl•• o,t the •• rul•• t~o. ri&ht to l.tt, To l.ara
... rul •• 18 to ohaas. o••• a .1ad. Is th.r. a ratio..l
va,. ot loaiag 0 •••• pealoa' I. aot tb~ ti.al wildo. the
WIly ot the 8lIo.ba 1. the 00 •• , the ra~lll tha ••• , the

.a

'¥

-~,
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burst obl1d with tlre?$6
!bere are two overt lmplleatloDs 1. thl. atat••entl

either a.

ultimate lack of a., orlterioa ot behavlor, or the trial aad error
metnod.
hapS,

Thoulh Dew.,'a worda allow suoh an i.terpretatloD, per-

he would. !lot subsoribe to either theor.,.

Por hIm the

1.-

tellise.ce haa the reapo.aib1lit., ot 10eat1ft, responaib1l1t7
betore overt act10R.

1. everf problemat1c s1tuat1on cOftoernlag

behav10r there are contl1etlag deairea

aael

alternative enoic•••

Choloe ot the r1ght aood demand. a aquariag ot the deair.d coa••qu.Doe. with the actual co••• queRces.
He.oe, i.quirr i. exacted, obserYatioR of the detailed.
makeup ot the situatloD, afta1,.i8 lato It. dlver.e
tactor •• alarifleatloD. of what ls obscure. discountlns
ot the more 1.8i.teat &ad viv1d tralt., tracial the
Gon.• equ ••ce. ot the varioua mode. of actioR that suI,e.'
thema.lve., rea-rdla, the deo1810a re.ened. a. hypothetical
••d tentatlve UJatl1 the antioipated or suppo.ed. co......
~ ..oes whioh 1.d to~lt. ad.optioR have be•• squared wlth
aotual co.eeque.ce •• ~7
Thi. almoat aaive explanatlon of oORsequence. proc.ed. trom 0 ••

mal. pr••uppoeltion,

Dewer co.celved man a8 an orga.lem, the

moat perteet of the an1mal ldqdom.,a

Joh.

mar

Therefore, as the anImal

W1lfrld Sellars, "Language, Rules aDd aehavior,·
of Soi.ace aad Freedoa, New York, The
re.e, 1~~~, l1. lii"l.!os III OrlllJlal~
$1 Dew.,., ~.oo•• t1'\1otl0., 164. :\1
$6

~W.l:

Ph110'O~h.r

~"

~>

S8 Joha Dewel.
mill.. , 1930, 329-393.

De~ocracl

!!! Education,

lew York, Mao-
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.,

reacts to stimuli and to environment, man i. to react to An7 moral
situation.

In other words, the correct consequences are supposed

to follow naturally the intelligent reaction ot man to a problematic situation.

Dewey assumes that "there i8 no breach ot con-

tinuity between operations ot inquiry and biologioa1 operations
and ph7sica1 operations. nS9

Since man is continuous with allot

nature, human experience is merely interaction with environment.
Man has intelligence which enables him to direot his present
activity toward a more profitable tuture.

In tact, this intelli-

gence is what we might oall the proper equipment to insure that he
does react to his environment in a suitable manner.

Dewey'S con-

cept ot man as a high type ot animal organism makes it extremely
ditti cuI t to arri ve a t a more ul tj.ma te ori teri on ot behavior than
consequences.

To the thoughtful person s.eing the obvious chaos

not only in the lives ot individuals, but also in the history of
~ation8J

a study of Dewey'S criterion tor behavior is not only

dissatisfying, but at times frightening.

However, it we keep in

mind that Dewey has rejected all intellectual oriteria, that he
pas tied his philosophy to particular

ciI~cum.stances,

we will

realize that he will always be dealing with situations only on the
surface, legislating only in vague, general

[~erms,

!\'"

sinoe hi.

ori terion mus t have enough elasticity to fi t",particular instances

59

Dewey, Logic, 19.
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ret not be absolute

and

univeraal.

For Dewe,. the moral .elt, .a oppo.ed to man .a an onto10gleal entlt7, 18 the belng in "the
Implled In Its actlvlt)"."60

~

rans_ ot

~latlon.h1p.

Bo1nS within nature, "interactIon 1.

the ono unoscapable traIt of .ver)" human oonoern."61 !h. moral
.elt, tn.n, i. In oontinuous formatIon both by ext.rnal relatlon.hip. and the choic•• Whioh react on the individual.

But

this

.tl1l do •• not answer the questIon ot Wbat it 1. tnat make. the
aot moral.

Dewe., cont..... that the soope ot moral aot. 18 im-

portant 81noe "moral. are as broad •• act. whloh oonoern our
relationship. with others.

And potentially tbi. include. all our

aot., even though theIr sooial bearing lt1&1 not b. thought ot at
the time o~ pertormance."62 !'he vel'., .ame criterion hold. In the
tield ot ethIc. whieh held In the prooes8 ot inquir)" and knowle4se--experl..nt&l actlvit., determine. val1d1tJ.
i. a law ot action and 1 ta eonsequen.e..

uA

!he moral law

moral law. • .18 a

tormula ot the way to re.pond when .peoltled oonditions pre.ent
th....lv...

orlglnal.

60

Ita aoundne•• and pertin.nce are te.te4 b., What
Dewef, Democracl

~

EducatIon, 409.
r
~"

Itallc. in

!a! If. ture. f~4.
62 Dewel, Democpacl ~ Educatlon, 414-1$.

61

Dewel, !!pepi ence

r~--------------------------~
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happens when

it is aoted upon."6) Every aot must go through the

laboratory of experience.

Now since this is so, moral progress

would be killed by a fixed moral law rooted 1n tixed natures,
For moral actions are suppo.ed to lead to the betterment ot envIronment, to a more meaningful 11te.
truth ls tlxed.

Consequently, no moral

"50 amount ot paina taken 1n torming a detinite

oa.e i8 tlnal; the consequence. of its adoption MUst be carefull.,
noted, and a purpo.e held only a. a working h1Pothesia until the
result. conflrm its rlghtn•••• "64 Morallty, l1ke knowledge, 1s
contlnuous and progresslve. 6S
Allot thls, however, does not tell ua preclsely how·
we know when behavlor is benetlclal.

How do we know exaotly when

behavior leads to the betterment of mankind?

This que.tion 1.

lett open bJ Dewey preoi.ely berause ot hi. concept ot the
aoolal order, at .an, and ot the function ot phl10.ophy.

newey

belleved that ''In tl ••• like the pre.ent, when industrial, po11t1 ..
cal, and sOlentltio

tpanato~atlon.

are In process, a rapId re-

visIon of all apprai.ala 1. a.,acially n.eded."66
Dewey,

~est ~

What would be

Certaintz, 278.

Dewe." BeconatNctIon, 175.
I

6S John De"el.. :suaan Kature
Modern L1bra:r7, 1930, 284.

~ O~nd.uct,

••" York, '!'he

66 John o.we,. and Jame. H. Tufts, Eth10', ••.., York,
Henry Holt and Co., 19.32. 2 9 $ . 1
1:1

ii
1.,1

!~
~

. ,I
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I;

,'

;,

the criterion of this rapid revision, Dewey tal1s to speolty.

!he

criterion really ralls under reflective morality where the individual seeks "to discover what should be esteemed so that approbation will tollow what i8 decided to be worth approving. • • ."67
In other word., the problem ot refleotive morality 1s to discover

.1

II

I

I:
!I

'I

I
I

.!

what 1s the baai8 tor mao'a unconsciously approving or blaming an
act.

This reflection then showl "that oontribution to universal

happiness or welfare 1s the only ground tor admiration and esteem. ,.68

Renoe it seems that the cri terion of an aot is whether

it benevolently atfects ffall sentient creatures who are aftected
bJ an act. ,,69 So the act must contribute to a kind ot general
well-being; otherWise, it i. not a good aot.
For Dewey In determining what doe. oontribute to general
well-being, absolutely everything must meet the test ot con •• quene...

"To generalize the reeognltion that the true mean. the

verified and means nothing else place. upon men the re.ponslbillt,.
tor surrendering politIcal and moral dogmas, and subjeoting to the
t.st ot consequence. their mo.t cherished pr.judlce •• "70
Cluen... alone are the

ftOl"JIl

Oons.-

whI.h guide u. "trul,._ "
!

-Ibid. ,

262.

-Dew.,.,

Reoonstruction.
160.
, .

67 IbId., 2$9.
68

69
70

-Ibid.

ItalIcs 1n

t'l

orlg1~~1.
~~ ,

ii

I'

I'
III!,
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Wh.n the claim or pr.t.~10n or plan 1. aote4 upon it
~1d •• u. tpull or tal.elll It leada u& to our .nd or
aval' lrO'ii Ii. Iii actIve, dJnaa1c funot10n 1. the all ...
Important
about It, and In the qualltl' ot aotlYltl'
induc.d. 07 1 t 1•• all 1 t. tNth and talel tl'. The hJPQ'"
the.la that work. i. the tNe on., and truth 1. an
abstract noun app11.d to ~oolleotion ot cas •• , actual,
torese.n and de.lr.d, that r.c.1Y. contirmation 1n th.ir
works and con.equ.no••• 71

thinf

Bow are .e to tell it the consequenc.. actuall, do
a.ftect man bene.flclalll'?
requiring .flxed

no~s

That would be an ultlmate crlterlon

and princlple..

Dew.1 wanted nelth.r.

aenoe Dewe,. never gave a detinite an.w.r to the qu•• tion.

'l'he

t1mes In Whioh he 11ved were t1••• of optim1s. and hop. in the
capaoity ot man tor Illlm1tabl.
inter •• t to the pr•••nt.

pro~e.&

it he contlned hl.

Moreo.er, Dewe,. conc.iv•• man •• an

orcanis. Whioh would r.aot Int.llisently in all .ituationa becau •• ot hi& or.ative int.lligenoe.
to

co~ld.r

Oons.quently, he n.v.r .....4

It nee.searl' to an.wer tb. t1nalque.tion ot what d.-

t.rmlne. ben.ticial or

inJuri~s

oonsequ.nc •• , or what crlterion

1s the arbit.r ot the universal happin••••

71

Ibid., 156.

Italics in origin,\l.

CHAPt'BB V

ORITIQUE OF DEWEY'S NOTIOW OF TRU!B
There are many choices open to the writ.r who would attempt .ither an .valuation or a cr1t1qu. ot John Dew."a notion ot
truth.

Each misoono.pt10n ot DeweJ oould

gated and th.n refuted.
volWl....

\borouahlJ 1nve.ti-

be

!bil, how.ver, would ba the work ot

There 11 an .aaier .ethod however, and one wh10h aea. .

baalo--tro. which other oritiquea ultimatel, would have to spring.
That II8llner of refutation i. to point out 80.e miaunderstandings

ot JOhn Dewel and to indioate oontradictiona inherent in his ooneept and tormulation ot the notion of truth.

In other wordl, we

shall pOint out e.rtain errora which we ma, .a., Dewe,. had a right
to uke, and otherl, which, in view ot hla a,.lt_, are absolutel,.
~nexcu.able,

1.

leading in tact, to the invalidation ot his .,ste••
MISUI'DER.STAtmI!fG OP THE IA'l'O'RE AID POllO'l'IOB
OF '!'BE INTELLECT

In an instruMental and pragmatiC philoaoph,. the Intel~eot

will have a speoial lunction, one

deter,~n.d

bJ utility.

jI':,.,

Conaequently, It m1&ht be .aid that the instt~lll!lentall.t cannot
.tart with the 1ntellect and discover ita nature trom its opera-
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tlon, but rather must postulate Its fUnotion trom what hal to be
done to aohieve suocessful activity_

newey, as has b.en aaid

earlier, attributed to the Intellect the task ot re.haping re.llt7-

The Intellect was to have an ettect on the real world.

POI'

ex-

ample, Dewey oondemned the .ewtonian view ot p081tlon and veloclt7
1n the _te.rlal world 81noe It
•• suaed that
'ependent ot
Yatlons, and
exact degree

these posltlons and velocltles are there InOur knovlng, ot our experl.ent. and obs.rthat ve have solentitlo knowledge If the
In which we a.certain tnem exaotly_

Thl. rejectlon of the power and task ot the Intelleot to a.oertaln
the nature. ot objectlve reallty come. tro. the tear that such a
theory would merely be a spectator tbeOFy ot knowledge.

Dewe,.

demanded that knowledge "not _rely- • • brlng about a Ghanae In
OUI'

own subjectl ve or mental attl tude. "2

Dewey telt, would not be particlpated In.
Into

~e

Xnowledse of thi. type,
"The act no more

ent.~

constltution of the known object than trav.llne to Athen.

to •• e the Parthenon had an7 ettect on archl teoture."l

SUoh a statement contalna a two-told error.

Firat ot

all, a "apect.tor fl 1_ not limited to .ere ob.ervatlon a. he la,
tor example, In the ca •• ot an athlet1c cont•• t.
that the only type ot chanse is that

ett.ct~a
?-;-.

J
"~

1

Dewey, saest

2

-

.3

Ib1d., 2l4.
Ibld.

!!!

,

Oertaintl' 201.

Dewey presum••

In the vialble, real

95
extra-mentai'world.

But the faot is that the knower beeoMe8 a

partIoIpant in a .1tal activity When a real, existing subjeot

00

into his mind 1n the intentional order and ette.ts a Change,
makina the knower a participant ot knowledge and not a .ere .peotator.

Deapite the tact that the obJect was true anteoedently to

knowle~.,

a new and vital relation enters the pioture when the

knower COIlles into possession ot the knowledge.
becomea an intentional part or the knower.

The known objeot

Consequently, realit1

is vitally atfected in so far as it enters a new relation, that
of .. known object.
know1ed,e.

ITo. this atate the knower may make use ot the

sut Ind.ependentl;y of us. the know1edg. will b. true or

ta1s. depending on whether or not there is conformity ot the inte11eot with the objeot.

Seoondl,. Dewey"

implicat10n in the

afore.entioned objection i . that what we have ju.t answered 1. not
what lOU would call a practioal oonsequence.

So•• extra-mental

practical con.equenoe must tollow tor thouSht to d•••r.e the naae
knowledge.

'What th18 obj •• tion ot Dewe,. doe. i. to eliminate the

tirst step in knovledse and to substItute What may, but muatnot

nec••sari1l and uni.ersall,. be, tbe .econd .tep.

Oon••quanee.

sometimes tollow the knowledge, but the,. do not con.tltute the
knowledge.

The acourat. repre.entation of

ph.

object con.tltute.

)'I'n

the lmovle4go.

But

Dewey's assumption 1. ~tsed on the theol"1 that

knowledse must always be functional since intelligence, .s we have
.e.n, i. th. interaotion with nature so that nature rea11.e -lta

r------------------~
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own potentIalIties In behalf of a fullex- and rlch.xevents."4

18~e

of

Our contention here is that he mistakenly takes the

functlon of the intellect from the 80cial ord8x- only.

He make.

affecting the soola1 order in a benefioial way the ultlmate and
only function the intellect has.
Thia conception ot tae work of the 1n'.1leot 18 an outgrowth ot the "scientific method" ear11er described Whioh was
inherited trom Comte and e.tab11aned along pos1t1vistio linea. It
waa ••ant to free philosophy from the bonda of tradition and the0108Y.

Instead it has absolutely di.enthraned the intellect by

postu1atlng tbe 8001010g1eal faotor .s the only important and
neoessary oonsideration.

Sociol08Y and the advance of civiliza-

tlon are noteworth,. governing moti ye.. But the,. alone do not explain tbe function ot the 1ntelleot.

Nobody deni •• their inherent

importance. 1ncre.sing, perhap., now more than ever before.

~e

emp1rioal and positivistiC weakness liea preclsely 1n the tact
that it i. an unproven as.ertion that the function
should be 40mp1e'e11 11m1ted to 8001al progre.s.

Dewe,.

al •• a

demonat~.tlon

or

the 1nk1,..

lowhepe do ••

proving the intrin.1c ne.eaait,. OP

pelation betwe.n the intellect and the aooial order.

80 vbile

r

Dewe"'a p08it1vist1c .ohool a.t. out to be ~ree trom tradit10n
:~ ,

and

!. erior1 pp1no1pl•• , it has patu1toual,. .. aerted 1t. own !.

4

-

Ibid., 21S.
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l?rlorl princIple from which has sprung i till entire system.
1s freely asserted may certainly

L~d

What

logicall} be rejected just

as .freely.
Dewey .tarts with the object and postulates in an a
2rIorl ta.hion

~at

wl11 be the function ot the actina subject.

Realll he shaul d conal del" the raoul

t,. and wha t i t can

do.

Prom

percelving the intellect in action, he would come to the con-

clusion that it was made for truth.
other functions.

Then be could proceed to Ita

But to proceed trom object to subject, as he

certainly seems to have done, 1a to Invert the order.

The actual

.fact and cause ot thIs error ls that Dewey was not interested in
truth or the ultimate function ot the intellect.

He waa essen-

t!ally an empiricist, one interested only In particular results.
We!"e he primarily a natural!.t,. a scientist seeking
only trutn, hi. philosoph,. would doubtless be a more
rigorous and stable 878tem; being primarily an empiriolst, he .u.t partiOipate in a culture whose living
patterns eludg moat Minda and whose planning often
..... tutile.)
And here i. the aoat practical refutation ot Dewey, •• we have
mentioned above, on the point ot the function ot the intellect:
he hi.aelf starts out with an

~2rlorl

theory, a method ot pro·

aedure Which waa one ot the chlef reasons

~¥
~}'I

tradi tional phIlosophy.

~~~~ .

he had rejected

"I,

r
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2.

MISUHDERSTAHDIN'G OF THE POWER 01' ABS'fRAO'l'IOlt
Akin to Dewey'. mistaken theory of the funotion of the

Intelleot 1. hIs faIlure to understand the power ot the Intelleot
to abatract, and henee oome from particulars to

unlve~.al.,

thereby ultimately arrectlng the concrete, partlcular problem.ticsituation on a

la~ger

soal. than is possible when consideration 1.

absolutely limited to the slngular.

For Dewel however, there

were only oomplete singulars, and they alone were endowed with a

power to arreot human artairs.
The singular objeot stand. out conspiouously because ot
its 8.pecially tocal and crucial posltion at a 8lven tIme
1n determination ot 80me proble. ot use or enjoyment
whICh the total complex environment pres.nt •• 6

Tn. stres. ot the paragraph,
"total."

by Deweyts own Choloe, talls on

The object was never to be i.olated.

Hence the only

profitable knowledge was that which dealt with a singular object

In its signifioanoe to an entire situation.

Bow suCh a theory

ignores completely the tact that man, tor example, can be considered as he i. in himself, with certain es.entlal propertle.
and other accidental properties.

It 18 not nece.aary to conceive

him first of all and only In problematic

s~tuatione,
~",

or in

Jl~,

relation to nature alone.

It i8 far more

~trthwh1le
.',

and accurate

to study man in hIs relatlonshlps with nature and the concrete

6 Dewey, Lolle, 67.

Italloa in original.
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enY1roaaent And then to ,.oo•• d to con.ide• .an In hl...1t wheno.

It 1. on11

will oome a knowleaa_ ot the ••••ntial and aoold.ntal.

07 suGh a pPOo.dur. that knowleclae wl11 p.al17 be .1sn1tloant.

Otb.ewl.e the objeot of oon.leleMtion, be 1t an or

80. .

other

objeot, wl1l be a .... ot qualltte. judged 01 an aocldental and
~

ar10.1 .pltorlon ot con••quantlal aotlon. wJ.thout e.e. 00.1111

to the ultlmate oon.14e.atlon ot what
to "

and make. a thlns

det.~n••

what I t la, and what 1t 1. that ak•• oert.ln .1nsular.

aot alva,.. 1n the .... anner.

that the
tlon~1p.

~nd

It 1e tuttle tor

~ve1

to _In_ln

auet ooneider ob3e.'a In the ooaplexli1 ot ..la-

In whloh the objeot 1. looated.

knowleqe no. au1'able •• 'lon.

~a

leada netther to

Ii •••ell _le•• a lettah out ot

the Oon0J'8M .1"'atlon.

Once

at ven

oon••rned onl7 with

thla , ..suppoaltion that the II1nd should h.
eono~e'. p.~'loul.~.

and haa on17

~e

tunctlon

of aolY1na p..hl_tto-sltuationa, 1t 1. 1aIpo••lble to eo_ ,. an

abaolute
thepe apa

019

ult!. . te

I.

o~t'a.ton.

ftel.ttria. .at follow .1nea

U!l7 ob.aqeable t ....:r•• 1n 8v817 oono...' . 8ituatlon.

An4- 1t ••lat191_ tollowa. th.n 1t Will .eptalDlr tollovima'

pro..... cannot be ma.e, top a ol'lt••loD ot

'~'h
,~

b••ome comple'e17 aubj •• tiye aln.e tb.

wl11 u1tlma'.17

.'

&"

on17f~ete~natlon

ot truth

:~

1. oonaequenoe., and ••tl.taotorr oon.equen••• Will va:ry a. plao.,
t1_. o11'ouutanoa, auel pl"Obl. . chan•••

r
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To take but one example, how
exhibits the same

oha~acterlstlca

18 1t

the world over'

the leaf ls the same .1ze, the bark the ....
.... t.xture.

that an oak tl-.e

00101-,

In the

l.~a.,

the wood the

A prooeas ot induction leads the ob••rvel- to the

ooncluaion that there ls a eonstano,. of propertl •• in the arbor
that .e call the oak.

A atudJ ot a .utfl.lent nuaber ot

~

wl11

enabla the Intel11lent observer to co.. to the concluslon that the
oak tHe hal a c.lttain nature which ls the cau.e ot theae Id.ntleal propertl •• In .ver7 oak tre..

To den,. that the Intellect haa

the power ot goIng trOlll the singular to the un! veraal 1a to 10
asalnst the experlenoe ot all un.

'fo deaancl that onl, the

.insular be consldere4, aa DeW8, doe. when he p08tulat.. the prllIA07

ot the partlcular, 1. to tll 1n the taoe ot oonvlnolna evi-

den•• on the empirloal le.el, evldence upon whIch everyone acta In
dally I1te, Inatrumentaliat. not exoluded.

Furthermor., IUch a

baaio misoonoeption ot the Intelleot'. pover, it .ineel-ely and
continuousl,. aated upon, would 1n no wa7 lead to prop•• s but
would ultimately thwart the solut10n ot partioular

p~obl.ma

07

Inoreas1ng their numb.r and. b1 n8,1.ot11'18 the laws whioh even the

poaltlve aclent1sts tollow.
Th...

sa..

~(

t'·,'

basio

m.1auncl..r.t.nd1nat~

are apparent In

Dewe,.'s explanation of the oonoept and the propolltlon, to which
.e now turn our attention.

r
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.3.

MISUI'tDERSTANDI NO THE NATURE OF THE CONCEPT

Since Dewe7 had misunderstood the runction of Intelllsenee and of knowledge, lt follows tnat his theor7 of the concept
had to be 1n line wIth these falae theories.

We saw that Dewey

adheres to Bridgman's definition ot the concept.

"In

g.ne~a1,

we mean b7 an7 concept nothing more than a set of operational the
concept is aynonomoua with the corresponding set ot operations."7
Dewey sals that "All oonceptions, all intellectual desoriptions,
~st

be formulated in terms of operations, actual or imaginatively

~o8s1ble."8
~t

Now as long as the concept concerns operations alone,

has a wide fleld ot activity, tor every operation which do.a

not involve selt-contradiction 1a e1ther actual or lmaginatively
poalible.

It, however, Dewey means completed operationa, no new

knowledge 1a posaible.
~oic.,

"!!,

Hence, h. would seem to preter the tirat

making the atatement reter to tuture operations, hence,

.!!.!! reter onll !!. ~

tu ture

!.2!!."9 Yet

l t the concept

..aters on17 to the futn.ll"e, there can be no teat ot ita validity,
.1nce a teat would nece.sarl1y tall in the paat.

~est ~

)rlg1nal.

7 Brldpan, Loli C
Certaintl, 111.

!!

Modern

Phla~!!.,

1~

8

Dewey, SHeat ~ CartalntI, 1Hf."

9

Feldman, Philoaoihy!?!

~

Dewel,

S. ot. Dewey,

54. Italics 1n

r
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'i!lhen

Dew.,. uses

the term n opera tlon," he doe. not .pe-

clfy whether he means a PDl.ioal or mental act.

Dewe,

00•••

olo.e to making a marrIage ot the two When he 1&18 "1n order tor
a concept to b. mean1ngful, it must (among other thing.' be posai-

ble to speciry the operat1ons by mean. ot which the obJeot
referred to may be det.oted.~lO

th1s would ~ean that tne ooncept

1e mental in so tar as 1 t proceeds

fl*OlIl

the worldng mind, but

physioal 1n so far as It 1s cau.ed by s1tuations.

But there 1.

absolutely no proof or reason given why all oonoept1ona "must be

formulated in terma ot operation," and we belleve that here 1,
a crucial error ot Dew,.._

He •• rel,. a:t"tll'ftl8, aa we aaw In the
mat
succe.stul activit, 1. had onlyln

e&JIIlle. ohapters, that the conoept lII1.t be an operation.

1t be an opeJ-Ation?

Beoauae

the sphere ot operatlon.

operatIon be the

te~

'Why

The questlon ls, vhf must wecesstul

ot the concept?

To thla question Dewe,..

glve. no an.wer save his original postulate ot the pl*lmaC1 ot
suocesstul aotiYity.

The contradiotions within Dewelt. th-orr,

or

ODce given hi. ol*lg1nal postulate., are not

suGh great MO.ent.

Th.• Important thins 18 the reason tor his postulate.

But he

neIther reascm nor proot but -re1, as.ertiona.
r

~.,

What Is valuable to note hore 1. ~'hat Dewey'. tirst
')

10

Fe1Uman, Philosophy of ,TohCl Dewey,

54.

61.0.

r
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relation with an objeot i8 in the order

or

practical judgment.

The operation he specifies i8 a reterence to aotion which oonters
a potential truth on the object.

It is a reterence to present,

palt or :ruture qualities or relations under speCified oondition ••
However, the tact is that practical consequences, the aspect

or

human activity in wnioh Dewey i8 most interested, depends upon
the nature ot environment, the extent to which 'fou know that
nature, and your. applioation

or

this knowledge to the object in

the known, ooncrete circumstanoe..

!hi. requires a menta.l repre-

.entation ot the extra-mental reality trom which successrul
aotivity will proceed a8 an etrect. not a cau.e.

newey, however,

ignores thi. and implie. vel', 01ear1y that knowledge is an etrect
rather than a cause ot succe.stul activity.

4.

MIStmDERSTAJfDING OF THE NATURE OF THE PROPOSITION

TO make the concept identical with operatIon is to make
the judgment and the proposition almost usele.s.
preceding chapter what Dewey means by the two.

W. a.w in the
A passage from

Dr. Ratner will serve to recall Deweyfs theory ot tne propositIon.
As Dr. Ratner ob.erve., Dewe,. give. the propositIon a functional
use of a slightl,-

lIO~e

involved na ture thank(the function attribu-

ted to the oonoept alone.

"i

w. would be totally unworthy ot the spirit hi. philosophy
inspires, ir W$ did not have the couraae to say that the
immediate intellectual apprehension or propo8itioft8 i8

r
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no more than the immedIate perception ot sense-data, a
ca.e of knowledge. • •• We do not know propositions
taken Individually and In isolatIon trom their functional
context • • • what we do know are proposition. taken together in their relationships to one another and to the
context In Which their evidential value i& developed and
used--l.e., we know propOSitions In their mediate relation
to the mind. 1I
While it 1s still not too olear Just how the proposition diftera
trom the

oo~cept,

it 18 clear that the proposition in Itself,

apart from its relation to the mind, is exactly like sense-knowledge.

But .enae-data in it.elt sives proof only ot its existence

whereas a proposition, in its meaning, stating the oontents of
the judgment, signifIes things to be

a8

the proposItion 8aya the,

are, therefore aa beina either true or talse in so tar a. reality
1a or i . not as the proposition affirms.

The obvious illation is

that tne truth and talaity ot propolltiona depends upon their contOrmity with reality.

We will not push this argument against

Dewey but rather ask him of what the thought consists.

consist ot consequences?

Doe. it

Certainly not, .ince that would be to

identity the cause with the ettect.

Are the contents ot the

proposition natures, true in themselves betore the judgment ex·
preased in the propo.ltion, and atfirmed by a oopula?

This would

be to aftirm a truth apart trom that whIch the criterion of eonsequence. establiahes.

Dewe7ta on17

~

answer~u1d

perforce be

')

Journal

11 Joseph Ratner, "John Dewey'S Theory of Judgment,"
PhllosopbZ, XXVII, 1930, 2S9-60. ItalIcs in original.

!!
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that the proposition is none of these things.

It 1s merely a

function whioh is justified by sucoessful consequenoes .. which, ot
course brings us to an impasse.

Like Dr. Johnson, we can only

explain to the gentleman, not give him understanding.

But we do

join a Dewey follower, and at the same time a critiC, who attributes Dewey's error to the stress on "the functional aspects ot
thinking, to the neglect of !h.!.! that thought is

2!.- "12

.

A more convincing argument against Dewey is the contradiotion to which his theory of the functional role of propositions
leads.

It i8 quite clear that propositiona, as means, must lead

to warranted assertions or truth.

In themselves Dewey maintains

that propositions can be neither true nor talae.

But because ot

the reciprocal action ot the criteria as explained in Chapter III.
a warPanted assertion would have to affirm the truth ot a propos!
tion.

Then. since propositions are by their nature neutral, eve

warranted assertion would be false.

As Thayer put. it:

Mo.t surprising, perhaps, are the consequences tor Dewerl.
well-knOwn theorr ot truth or warranted assertion. For,.s
I have tried to show, it warranted assertions assert something about proposi tiona, namely that they are true or
that theT are false, but propositions are bJ definition
neither true nor tala., then every warranted as.ertion
muat be false alnce. • .no warranted assertion could be
tN. it 1. t aa ••pt.d 80mething to be th~~ cas. concerb.ing
proposi tiona whIeh, by defIn1 tioD or Plf~ or agreem.ent, 1.

12 }I'eldman, Ph.ll0$O~1 of John tiel' 112. The sam..
objeotion we have proposed 1. ~ven-bl Fel
n. ItaliCS in
ol"l&1na1.

r
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not the" case at all. 13
fhe cause of this inconsistency in Dewey could well be said to be
the tact that he has been unconsciously oaught in a maze ot a
priori postulates Which he thought he had categorically denied,
but which in reality he

afri~8

and places at the

ve~

foundation

or his philosophy.

5.

CONTRADICTION IN DEWEY'S DENIAL OF A PRIORI AND ABSOLUTE

With great vehemence does Dewey deny both the need and
the actuality ot

~Eriorl

principles.

tutile bases for truth in hi. system.
which is tested.

Consequently even

There are to be no such
The only truth Is that

! Erlorl and absolute prin-

ciples must not escape this teat.
Despite thIs protest against

~

prIor1 and absolute prin-

Ciples, we find Dewey involved in the unhappy Situation of attirm.1ng statements whIch necessarIly involve some .!
Ps a matter ot tact, most of his 10g10, as

on these very prinolp1es.

In

co~~entlng

w(!

~rior1

prine1,l. .

have sald, is baaed

on Deweyts LogiC, J.

Oliver Buswell, Jp. points out this inoonsistency.
On pages 256, 262, and 263 there are at least eight
reterenees to "n80.1.817" 10g1ca1 re1a ,10nlh1p a, retel"enoee in the most familiar and ordina. sty1., which
are completely unintelligible unless tIi , !. eriori

tt

13

Thayer, Lot$16

2!.

PrapatlaDl, 12.

r
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character or logical prinoiples i8 assumed. Neither
Dewey nor anyone else can writ. extensively without
assuming the prior qualitJ or logical principle.. EXamples might be multiplied U18.nirold, a8 when Dewey use.
such phrases aa "10gical11 ilQp08sible, becau •• involving
contradictions • • • " (Logic, 300), "the emergenoe or
contradiction., as in ~tio ad absurdum, II proot • • • "
(~f.C., )01). Aa Dewey progresii. more deeply into the
au ect matter of logiC, the examples of inadvertent
appeal to the ~ eriori, increaae in frequency.14

Th••• contradictions are at the very .roundation ot Dewe,.'. philosophical syatem.

Naturally they are inevitable, tor once he

rejected, as he thought, the absolute and ! eriori truth, he va.
rorced to poatulate his own crIterion tor truth--conaequenc •••
While verbally rejecting the

~

erlori, he accepted uDder another

torm precisely what he had vehemently rejected; tor hi. balic
prinolple--the only truth i8 that whioh i. tested--i. in itaelf
an

~Rrlori

and unverifIable principle, or 1t 1a nothing at all.

The dilemma 1a obvlous.

Elther Dewey haa an

~

pr10rl prInciple

at the basis ot h1s phIlosophy, 1n which caae hia universal criterion ot conaequenc •• is not universal aince at leaat one truth
•• capes the ¢r1ter1on

or

veri£1ab11ity.

Or, taking the other horn

ot the d1lemma, the cri t.rion 1 tselt nuUlt be t.ated, 1n which ca ••
the crit.rion become, us.lesa ainee 1t is a prinoiple which cannot
be veri tied in the empirical order; nor did Oew81 himself anywhere
/)

eyer auba1t hi. tirst principle to the te.t'ot consequences.

~

14 auswell t Jr., ~n. Ph1loaophie. ot F. R. Tennant
John Dewel, 427-2~. Itan:c. In orIgInal. - - -
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Furth.rmo~.,

Dewey us •• precisely the! Rr10rl a,a1nst

which he inveighs when he rule. out all knowl.dge ot supra-Iensl ...
ble thlngs, that Is, the soul, God, and the very p08s1bl1ity ot an
atte~

lit. which might act

on this earth.

a8

a stimulus tor better living here

Admittedly, trom an historical standpoint, p.ople

who have believed in these realities have lived perlonally happy
11vea and have had a beneticial etr.ct upon the re.t ot the world.
Hospitals, sohools, charitable organizations ot all aort. are
testimony ot thls.

Yet Dewey_ supposedly supremely interested in

the advanoe ot civilization and. the unlvepaal happlness, rule.
out both an atter 11te and a relation to the sup.rnatural 81.,17
becau.e he t.el. that thele cannot be t.lted empirloally.

!he

glaring contHdlctlon i. that he rulel th•• ou.t !. 2riori, not .ven
allowing tor the pOlsibility ot .1ther .mpirlcal veritlcation or

ot the practlcal utility ot such motlvel.
The only way out ot this maze ot oontradiotiona ia to
adhere oompl.te1y to a the0rJ that olalu tnth limply il not
attainab1., a. Dew.y .... clos. to dOing when speaking of .01ence.
It 1s the baaic Idea ot DeweT that the . .thod ot mod.rn
soienoe beoo... und.rltandable only it we drop tn. conoeptlon ot .oienee a. a 171tem of abaolute trutbA. It
the Icientltic work ot Ant1qui t7 and ot the M1ddle AS••
. . . . . • 0 Ineffioient 1n oo....ison with the aolenoa ot
ModerD '11'1••• the rea.on 1. to b. tound In the taot that
tn. leienoe of Uba anolents was a slaPCh tOl" n••••• lti ••

r
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and essencea, a "que.t tor certalnty_ "lS
In other word., abandon the abaolute, abandon • qu •• t tor .er-

talnt,., and ,.ou wl11 have the next best thIng to truth.

The above

1. ..rely the expre •• lon ot the prlnclples e,..er,.where inherent 1n
the phl1osoph,. at Dewe,._

6.

THE HAZARD OF TRUTH AND OF FAITH IN '!HE INTELLECT

Onoe all

~

21'101'1 and absolute pr1nolple. bad been a-

bandoned and conaequenoe. had

~e.n

plaoed In thelr atea4 aa a

orlterion ot truth, Dewe,. va. 10&10al In attirains, a ••e bave
t.el that the rI.le and the hazard Vill

~-t• •H'

Intul'ecreat p1'e-

oautiona In the .eareb tor truth a. "ell aa open ne•
inhlleotual 41soover7 to 'the Intrepi4
./

6> (.) p 'r /f:

):t;

.t~.l-~~".t,,"

Indlv1dua~ •

(."

truth 18 not acquired ex.ept b7 ri.le and adventure.

-r1xed endl upon one slde and fixed pr1nclple.,-that i l authoritative rule.,--on ~e other are prop.
tor a teellng ot latetf, the refuse ot the tim1d,~and
the meana b7 which the bold pr87 upon the tlm1d.~

Now whether Dewel willa it or not, #e puts evel'7' 1ndlVidual 1n the
atate ot belna the tirst man.

Each perlon must besin the

~e.~.~..

Bane Reichenbaoh, "Dewey'_ !heor,. of Science," ~.
Phll0.0. ot John ~;;~' ed. Paul A. Sohlipp, Evanston, lfortn:1$

ve.iem nlViriIi7,

.

j

182.

16 John Dewey, EI'Ais i%). EXperimental Lopo, Ohl0.SO,
Universlt7 ot Ohlcago Pre •• , 1 1&;-231.
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tNth anew tor no two sets ot circumstances are ever complet.17_11~

l1ke.

Yet, truth 1s somethlng to be invented in p8l'ticular clr-

oumstances by tr1al and error.

It would 10glcally follow, It we

reduce his explicit theory to inherent absurdity, that the moat
adventurous man would be he Who questiona all past knowledge and
teata e ..rr poaslble truth tor hlmaelf, 8ince even

~e

acceptance

ot proposltions thought to be true In the paat, even thouan conditionall, accepted now, would be "props tor a teeling

or

aatet,.

the retuae of' the timid, and the .eans by Whioh the bold pre,. upon

the timid."

!his prooedure would 1n no way .olve the 80c10log1cal

problema Dewey

80

de.lre. to 801ve.

For in retu.8ing to acoept

and build upon truth. 41800vered. in the pa.t the ettort. of each
indlvidual would prove tutI1e .ast ot the tim., and culture would
deeline and not advance.
would not oonsole men.

towaPCb 1 t.

The thought that truth 1. a journey
A journey

m., be away trom home .a well a.

While these 1deas -1 seem • trance , they are not

1_g1n.4. but are implicitl,. stated

l' tf't'

' ;;

Dr

Dewey, tor he agr.e. quite
-----

thoroughly with p.irc.~~at the only real possession ot truth 1.
had by it. vel'7 ab.ence, in other word. by a continual v07ace

-...

~-'

.,

toward it.

~1
"Truth 1. that concordance of an abstract staHaent v1 th
the ideal lim! t towards 1Ilhich endless inv•• tigation would
tend to bring .cientifio belier. which eonoordanee the
abstraot statement may POS.8SS b:r v1rtue ot the cont....
alon ot its inaccuraoy and one-aid.dne ••• and tbi •
./ <~'N'" ,,,v --~

,
..

'\

111

.9ontesslon 18 an assential ingredient ot truth. 17':
M£llij T'f'r;zJ1Gf.
In answer to this we reply ~truth is not a c()ll.t()l"Dli t'1 :Qet~~'.!n

the mind and things, and it' no principles or norme are
true, how could one know what the "ideal limit" ia?

nece~Il!_~,::~!!

The diffi-

culty is obvious.
c-r~".··;
,
"

I,;;

p/;:

I·' /:

.

Dewey felt that he had eliminated all difticulties

emphasizing the adventurous quest tor truth.

bl

Risk, adVenture,

change, and beneticial consequences are all that interest him.
Pol'

DeWt)',.

there is the unceasing polemic against any traf'tie with
"cel'ta1nty" that runs a8 .. thread tl:utough all Dewe,., s
his tori cal ori ti 01 su • To tr1 end and to e thia haa
otten appeared the most enaracteri8tlc teat~e ot hi.
treatment or the hiatorT ot philo8ophy_ • • • We have
thoroughly learned that ideas are relative to a context,
and that neither history nor soience reveala any fixed
abaolutes. 18
In the end, then, we must ask it we should oondemn a man who eo__

to the inevitable talse conclusions

or

hi. original assumptions?

Logically, Dewey's system 18 fairly well knit.

But his end 18 to

retorm environment, to have a vital and beneficial eftect on
culture.

th~

Without truth there can be no lasting nor benefioial

17

Dewey,

ril

c, 34..$. Dewey complete If aareea wi th
The essential ata tement 1n regard to
truth is to say that we do not have it.

this deflnl tion of Pe rae.

18 John Herman Randall, Jr., "Interpretation of

Iliiat0X'7 ot Philoaoph,., tJ The PhilO.O~h~ ot John Dewel, e4. 'aul

Sehlipp, .orthw•• tern UnI ••ratty.
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etteets, but merely e. chaos ot relativistic effort.,. unguided and
futile because of their lack of a definite end and ot a detinite

criterion.
Dewey 1 s only attempt to avoid the above
to poatulate a faith in the

Intellee~,

conclus.!_Ollli~_

a taith that i . oertainly

lliaplaced in view ot what bas been said at the beginning ot this
chapter.

/": ' l "
.~ ..! '

1.;,.

#'

f.
.t.,'

']'
J'

I:,:

~"_

/"

The legi tima te hope then, and indeed our only hope, tor
aurvival and well-being 1n a world halt wild and halt
allen to human interests, will be taitb in human intellisenee: 1n ita capaclty to oraanize and oontrol tho ••
featuros and materials of the world as can be brought
into acoord with what is humanly needed. priZed, and
desired. • • • For it 1. within the setting ot nature
and experience that human 1ntelllgenp, Is nourished and
discovers its vooation and functlon.~9
But

there is no logic in calling tor fai th 1n a inatJ!l.lment which.

almo"t by definition i . inoapable ot finding truth.
contradicts himselt.

He teaches that certainty and

Dewey 01ear17
t~th

are best

attained when we reallze that we do not and cannot have the••
!ben he aaka tor taith in the power ot an intelleot, whioh haa
already been depr1ved ot It. proper end, to know truth and thua
to control the materlala ot the world.
oan be no truth and no oonatructive

ot environment.

With suoh a belief there

.tto~t.

toward the re.haping

In aubndtting everything to the test ot action

r
11.3
he Is toreea to abandon all truth. even as tbat toward wbioh one

la working.

With newel there Is simp17 no basls lett tor an in-

dependent .stlmat. ot truth .s such.

1.

OOIOWSIOlf

l."

It i8 quite olea:r that ilhere can b. no tNth In the

Se was so stronal7 intluenced bJ the

phllos0ph7ot Dewe7_

a~ ...

• pher. ot chanae and materlal prosr.s. that all hIs consideratIons

wre tled up In the eonorete, parttcular .1tuatlon.
taot that he wanted to be an
he 1. aowall,. neither.

tIed b7 experienee.

1n.t~ntali.t

ne'plta the

and a Ira..-tl.',

'or him on17 that i . true which Is Yerl-

But tnl • •ary prInciple, thl. criterion it-

.elt oannot be te.te« ..,irioall,..

Theretore, the

prinoiple~

u.e •••• crIterion il arb1tr&r7. and a8 an arb1trar7 pr1nclple-one 1;hat cannot be empir1call7 , •• te4--1t haa no 10110al valld1t7
1n hi. own ph1loloph7.

With the de.t1'Uotlon ot thil ba.ie pru-

elple, hi. entire ph110.oph7 tall., tor it 1. the foundation upon
Whloh all hi. theorle. are buIlt.
Dewe7 hi.elt wa. • good man, and we

114,. auppos., .11'1-

.erell inter•• ted 1n the proare•• ot human1t7 and ot the Indiyld-

ual.

But hi. entIre philoloph7, .uPpo.e417 centered on amellorat-

ina .001a1 cond1tlon., luoceed. only In ellminating the moat Y1tal
la.tor governina the actIon ot a

o~ •• tur.,

namely, hl. rel.tlon

r
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to a

"

O~eator

and the happiness tnat eom.s trom rlSbtl,. ordering

aetlona to the end of man, beatitude.

Sinoe onl,. ph,.sloa1 nature

and the data of con8oiou8ness whioh can be empirlc.ll,. t •• ted

true, this

~lation

.~.

to • Oreator 1. arbitraril,. ruled out trom the

yer, bea1nnlng even a. a po.albillt,. 81noe 1ts oon ••queno ••-the tlDal attalnment or loss
In thi. 11te.

or

manta 1•• t end--oannot b. Yerltled

Henee, tne action ot man, coapletel, and entlrel,.

berett ot • relatIon to • Creator, can at be.t baye onl,. temporer,.
re.ults.

He 1. tundam.ntal1r .ubordinate to • pro.e •• ot ohan,.,

and, at be8t, translent, t.mporarJ progreaa.

Becauae

~th

ha.

be.n Yitlated, the end ot _n and the nature ot un have been
••••ntl.11, Ghanaed.
Maher typ. ot an1nsal.

Man tor Dewe,. baa beeo.. • more unusual and
And. there 1e no ,POape.. 01' adyancement

or adoptIon ot law. and method. beneficial to all In a _"17
an1ra.al kingdom..
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